CHAPTER 10 - THE LANGLEY SCRAMBLE
Summary
As we have seen, the 9/11 Commission rejected broad agreement amongst FAA/NORAD/White House/Secret Service/Pentagon sources that Flight 77 and/or Flight 93 were the cause of the Langley scramble. Of particular interest were the harmonious firsthand accounts of the NORAD command chain consisting of NORAD Continental Commander Arnold (Com-Arnold Test, Air Force-Arnold), NEADS Commander Marr (Com-Marr MFR, Air Force-Marr, ABC-Marr, Newhouse News-Marr), and NEADS Technician Powell (Com-Powell MFR) who authorized, ordered, and executed the scramble. Also of interest were the harmonious firsthand accounts of FAA hijack net managers Belger (Com-Belger MFR) and Weikert (Com-Weikert MFR).

The 9/11 Commission instead claimed the scramble was caused by an erroneous report that Flight 11, which hit the World Trade Center at 8:46, was still airborne and heading toward Washington D.C. (Com-pg. 34). To support its position, it cited/quoted a 9:21 call between NEADS and the Boston Center’s military liaison concerning the phantom Flight 11 and a brief exchange between NEADS personnel (Com-pg. 26-27), which did not by itself come close to proving that prior awareness of Flights 77 and 93 was not the main driver of the scramble – particularly because both Arnold and Marr affirmed their awareness of the erroneous phantom Flight 11 report, but insisted it was not a main driver of the scramble order (Com-Marr MFR, Air Force-Marr, Air Force-Arnold). Nevertheless, the 9/11 Commission publicly released the aforementioned recorded exchanges that supported its narrative and omitted all contradictory evidence cited (Rutgers, NYT).

The 9/11 Commission dubiously claimed it could not discover the origin of the Boston Center’s erroneous phantom Flight 11 report (Com-pg. 26). This was despite all Boston Center communications having been recorded (Rutgers, NYT) and despite NEADS technicians (where all communications where likewise recorded (Kean/Hamilton)) having been linked in to Boston controllers’ headsets so they could hear everything Boston heard in real-time (Newhouse News).

The 9/11 Commission only asserted that the report must have been the FAA’s mistake, not the military’s (Com-pg. 26). This was perhaps to draw attention away from the fact that on 9/11, NORAD was in the midst of a days-long exercise known as “Vigilant Guardian”, which simulated multiple hijackings and even inserted false radar blips onto NEADS screens in the middle of the attacks. Thirty hours of audiotape from the NEADS’ control room released for the production of the Hollywood film “United 93” and analyzed by Vanity Fair revealed that the NEADS crew engaged in chases of multiple phantom hijackings due to exercise-related misinformation that peaked during the actual attacks. It is highly probable the phantom Flight 11 report was attributable to the exercise (Vanity Fair). However, the 9/11 Commission ridiculously claimed that the exercise “expedited” NORAD’s response to the 9/11 attacks (Com-pg. 458 FN 116), as we will discuss in more detail shortly.

The 9/11 Commission falsely claimed the military omitted any mention of the phantom Flight 11 report in official documents (implying a cover-up) (Com-pg. 34), when in fact the official Air Force 9/11 history quoted both Arnold and Marr verbatim as being aware of it (Air force-Marr, Air Force-Arnold).

Under credible threat of prosecution, the 9/11 Commission successfully convinced NORAD Commander Eberhart (Com-Eberhart MFR+Test) and NORAD Continental Commander Arnold (Com-Arnold MFR+Test) (but not Air Force Vice Commander Colonel Scott (Com-Scott MFR) or Air Force Secretary General McKinley (Com-McKinley MFR)) to flip flop and invited only them to the public unveiling of its new narrative during the June of 2004 public hearing so they could formalize their endorsement of it (Com-Eberhart Test, Com-Arnold Test).

Sources:
ABC News, 9/11/2002, “9/11: Interviews by Peter Jennings” (Interview of NEADS Commander Colonel Marr)
Leslie Filson, 2003, “Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission,” pgs. 59, 63, 71-73, published by Tyndall Air Force Base Public Affairs Office
New York Times, 9/7/2011, “Newly Published Audio Provides Real-Time View of 9/11 Attacks”
Newhouse News, 1/25/2002, “Amid Crisis Simulation, ‘We Were Suddenly No-Kidding Under Attack’”
Newhouse News Service, 3/31/2005, “Commander of 9/11 Air Defenses Retires”
Rutgers University Law Review, 9/7/2011, “Full Audio Transcript”
Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton (9/11 Commission Chairmen), 2007, “Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission,” pgs. 85-88
U.S. Congress, 10/25/2001, “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Role of Defense Department in Homeland Security” (Transcript: NORAD Commander Eberhart Testimony)
Vanity Fair, 10/17/2006, “9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes”
9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003, Public Hearing (Transcript: Colonel William Scott, Major General Craig McKinley, Major General Larry Arnold Testimonies)
9/11 Commission, 10/27/2003, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of Lt. Jeremy Powell”
9/11 Commission, 1/23/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of NEADS Commander Colonel Robert Marr”
9/11 Commission, 2/3/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Craig McKinley”
9/11 Commission, 2/3/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of Major General Larry Arnold”
9/11 Commission, 2/4/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of Colonel William [or Alan] Scott”
9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Edward Eberhart”
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, Public Hearing (Transcript: General Eberhart, Major General Larry Arnold Testimonies)
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, Public Hearing (Transcript: Remarks by Lead Staff Investigator John Farmer, Executive Director Philip Zelikow, Commissioner Ben-Veniste)
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pgs. 26-27, 34, 458 (Footnote 116)
9/11 Commission, 7/29/2004, untitled letter from the Commissioners and Executive Director Philip Zelikow to DoD Inspector General Joseph Schmitz and DoT Inspector General Kenneth Mead (Requesting investigations into the cause of public statements made by NORAD and FAA officials deemed by the 9/11 Commission to be false)

9/11 Commission Rejects Evidence That Langley Scramble Was Caused by Flights 77/93, Claims Sole Cause Was Phantom Flight 11, Cites Transcripts That Do Not Prove Its Narrative, Falsely Claims NORAD Omitted Phantom Flight 11 Reports, Pressures Top NORAD Officials to Flip Flop
We previously saw that numerous sources confirmed the military’s 9:24 Langley scramble was in response to FAA alerts regarding Flight 77 and/or Flight 93. Sources included Garvey, Belger (firsthand witness), Weikert (firsthand witness), Asmus, Schuessler, Steenbergen (firsthand witness), FAA, NORAD, Eberhart, Scott, McKinley, Arnold (firsthand witness), the Air Force, Marr (firsthand witness), and Powell (firsthand witness). And White House/Secret sources’ statements (Riggs (firsthand witness), Cheney, Garabito (firsthand witness), Clarke (firsthand witness)) regarding early warnings of one or both of these aircraft also strongly suggest the military would have ordered the scramble in response.

However, the 9/11 Commission claimed the Langley scramble was in response to a false report that Flight 11 (which hit the WTC north tower at 8:46) was still airborne and heading toward Washington D.C. It goes without saying that this was report was never visually verified by a single civilian or military flight controller on primary radar because Flight 11 no longer existed. Page 34 of the Final Report stated:

“The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington D.C. …The [Langley] fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but also from taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records. Yet this response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense.”

The 9/11 Commission listed extensive evidence for this narrative – NEADS taped conversations, NEADS logs, NORAD Headquarters logs, FAA taped conversations, and other records. However, this statement has no footnote. Therefore, there is actually little publicly available evidence to support this statement besides a few short transcriptions in the body of the Report, which we will discuss momentarily.

The report of a phantom Flight 11 which no one could ever find because it did not exist can be traced to Colin Scoggins, the Boston Center’s military liaison. At 9:21, he called NEADS and stated:

“I just heard a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it’s on its way towards – heading towards Washington… it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower… I would assume he’s somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south… he is a hijack.” (pg. 26)

This call was fifteen minutes after the FAA Command Center had officially notified all traffic control centers in the nation Flight 11 hit the World Trade Center, per Jane Garvey’s testimony to congress ten days later after 9/11. The sudden alleged reappearance of Flight 11 was a bizarre contradiction to the widely disseminated facts and warranted careful investigation by the 9/11 Commission into where the false report originated. The 9/11 Commission concluded:

“We have been unable to identify the source of the mistaken FAA information.” (pg. 26)

Likewise, the memorandum summarizing the staff’s interview with Scoggins stated:

“AA11 went off radar at [the Boston Center] after its impact… A minute or two later [the Boston Center] personnel conceded that it was AA11… but got a call afterward saying AA11 might still be airborne and headed towards DC… [Scoggins] never learned who originally reported AA11 heading towards DC.”

We saw from the 2011 Rutgers recordings/transcripts that Boston Center communications were certainly recorded on 9/11. Furthermore, according to Newhouse News, Boston Center communications were being listened in on in real-time by NEADS, where all audio was likewise being recorded. That article drew heavily from an interview with Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley, head of the “ID Tech” team on the NEADS operations floor, which was responsible “to facilitate communications between NEADS, the civilian F.A.A., and other military commands.” The article further stated:

“At 8:43 a.m., Dooley’s technicians, their headsets linked to Boston Center, heard of a second plane, United Flight 175, that also was not responding. It, too, was moving to New York.”

Therefore, it is certainly suspicious that neither the 9/11 Commission nor Scoggins could ever find out where the phantom Flight 11 report originated.

Adding to suspicion was the fact that NORAD was in the midst of a days-long exercise known as “Vigilant Guardian”, which simulated multiple hijackings before and during 9/11. Thirty hours of audiotape from the NEADS’ control room released under subpoena by the 9/11 Commission and later analyzed by Vanity Fair revealed that the NEADS crew engaged in chases of multiple phantom hijackings due to exercise-related misinformation that peaked during the actual attacks. Vanity Fair stated:

“For the NEADS crew, 9/11 was not a story of four hijacked airplanes, but one of a heated chase after more than a dozen potential hijackings—some real, some phantom—that emerged from the turbulence of misinformation that spiked in the first 100 minutes of the attack and continued well into the afternoon and evening.”

The article went on to quote several exchanges between NEADS and the Boston Center regarding the phantom Flight 11, implying that the false report was attributable to the exercise. However, the 9/11 Commission ridiculously claimed (footnote 116 on page 458) that the exercise “expedited” NORAD’s response to the 9/11 attacks. This will be discussed in more detail in a coming chapter.

The NEADS technician who received this phantom Flight 11 call from Scoggins told his Mission Crew Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Nasypany. Per the 9/11 Commission Report, Nasypany said in response:

“Okay, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he’s heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now…” (pg. 26-27)

It is worth noting that this is not a transcript of an actual call or scramble order transmitted to Langley. Rather, it is a conversation between a NEADS technician and Lt. Col. Nasypany, who did not have authority to issue the scramble order, which explains the next excerpt from the Report:

“After consulting with NEADS command, the crew commander issued the order at 9:23: ‘Okay . . . scramble Langley. Head them towards the Washington area… [I]f they’re there then we’ll run on them… These guys are smart.’ That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 9:24.” (pg. 26-27)

“NEADS command” referred to NORAD Northeastern sector (NEADS) Commander Colonel Robert Marr – the officer in charge of NEADS who issued the scramble order. If the 9/11 Commission wanted to firmly debunk and contradict years of FAA and NORAD testimony about what really precipitated the Langley scramble, there was no better source to turn to than Colonel Marr. Unfortunately for the 9/11 Commission, Marr soundly rejected its narrative.

According to the memorandum of his January of 2004 interview with the 9/11 Commission staff, the staff presented their selective audio clips and then tried to convince Marr that he ordered the scramble purely in response to phantom Flight 11. However, Marr replied that while he did hear the phantom Flight 11 report from Boston, he logically considered it unreliable since its alleged location was well outside Boston’s radar’s range. And, more importantly, Marr plainly told the Commission that he received the Flight 77 and 93 hijack reports before they crashed, he considered them to be a threat to Washington D.C., and he order the scramble to protect Washington D.C. Here are several key excerpts from the memorandum:

“[Marr] recalled getting information on AA 11 still heading south, and upon discovery that the information was from ZBW (FAA Boston En Route Center) – thus to Marr having low reliability since it was out of ZBW radar range.”

“Marr’s memory of AA 77… was that he had received information on a threat perceived on Washington, D.C. and on the White House.”

“Marr noted that much going on led him to believe Washington was at risk, and he commented that in his recollection UAL 93 was hijacked.”

“Marr noted that he decided to scramble in response to a variety of events that occurred. Marr explained that even though the operations floor represented to Commission staff that it was for a threat from AA 11, Marr scrambled to protect the NCA [National Command Authority – i.e. the Pentagon and the White House].”

“Commission staff presented to Colonel Marr that it appears based on the evidence that Langley was launched in response to AA 11 being reported headed south towards Washington, D.C… He did not concede that it was specifically related to AA 11, and he concluded that it was based on a number of factors, including those noted above.”

Furthermore, as we also saw previously, Marr stated the matter plainly six months prior in a June 2, 2003 e-mail which was later quoted verbatim in a letter by the 9/11 Commission to the DOD and DOT Inspectors General. The e-mail stated:

“The answer on AA77 is not easy, nor is it pretty. At the time AA77 was occurring we were focused on UAL93 which was the only confirmed hijack that the FAA had identified to us. My records show UAL93 reported as hijacked at 0916L, once we found it and identified it's [sic] westerly heading, we scrambled Langley at 0924L just in case it turned around toward DC, which it did later. At 0924L we also received a call from the FAA about AA77 with a follow-up call at 0925L. It is easiest to explain the simultaneous scramble order with the AA77 notification as the scramble being against AA77 - it takes a lot of time to explain to the public that you're scrambling fighters against a plane heading away from the possible target.”

Now look again at the 9/11 Commission’s transcription of Marr’s scramble order:

“Okay . . . scramble Langley. Head them towards the Washington area… [I]f they’re there then we’ll run on them… These guys are smart.”

Who are “these guys” Marr referred to and why are they “smart?” In light of Marr’s interview, the most logical interpretation is that Marr was aware of multiple, simultaneous threats to Washington D.C. that had been smartly coordinated by multiple hijack teams. Once again, the brief quotations cited the 9/11 Commission used to support its narrative do not by themselves come close to debunking the broad agreement between FAA/NORAD/Secret Service/White House sources we have covered about Flight 77 and/or Flight 93 precipitating the Langley scramble.

As stated, the 9/11 Commission eventually released to the public (via Rutgers Law School and the New York Times) in 2011 the cited audio clips and transcripts that appeared to support its narrative while withholding all other NEADS/FAA transcripts which purportedly would have debunked its narrative. If Colonel Marr is correct, the still-unavailable NEADS tapes from the over twenty perpetually active weapons and flight controllers stations there (per Commission Chairmen Tom Kean’s and Lee Hamilton’s book, “Without Precedent”) contain evidence that Marr received FAA warnings regarding Flights 77 and 93 that contributed to his decision to scramble the Langley fighters.

Now recall the last sentence from the Final Report pg. 34 excerpt we saw earlier in which the 9/11 Commission accused military officials of trying to obscure the true reason for the Langley scramble. The excerpt stated:

“Yet this response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense.”

This sentence is patently untrue. Commissioner Ben-Veniste tried to make the same claim when he addressed General Arnold in the June of 2004 public hearing, stating:

“General, is it not a fact that the failure to call our attention to the… notion of a phantom Flight 11 continuing from New York City south in fact skewed the whole reporting of 9/11, it skewed the official Air Force report, which is contained in a book called ‘The Air War Over America,’ which does not contain any information about the fact that you were following, or thinking of a continuation of Flight 11…?”

Commissioner Ben-Veniste’s statement was ironic because the Air Force’s report is precisely where phantom Flight 11 was referenced twice. The report gave it the same level of attention it received from Colonel Marr, per his interview. Namely, it was one small factor in the morning’s events, but not the main driver of the Langley scramble like Flights 77 and 93 were. First, on page 59, General Arnold called attention to the phantom Flight 11 call after being warned by the FAA about Flight 93:

“United Airlines crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m… [Larry] Arnold says. ‘As we pulled out of the exercise we were getting calls about United Flight 93 and we were worried about that. Then we had another call from Boston Center about a possible hijacking, but that turned out to be the airplane that had already hit the south tower but we didn’t know that at the time.’”

Then on page 63, the report and Colonel Marr recalled the phantom Flight 11 call after being warned by the FAA about both Flight 77 and 93 – and ordering the scramble in response to all three, just like he told the 9/11 Commission staff:

“With little time to grasp what had happened in New York, the FAA continued to report more shocking information in the Northeast sector: American Airlines Flight 77 and Delta Airlines Flight 1989, both 767s bound for Los Angeles, were possible hijacked. Somewhere over Cleveland, United Airlines Flight 93 bound for San Francisco was still off course.

‘The FAA is starting to report more aircraft not following their flight plans,’ Marr says. ‘Now we are looking at a host of potential problems. Then we get another call from Boston Center that we have a problem near Washington and ‘you’d better check on it.’

The North Dakota alert pilots were still in their cockpits at Langley Air Force Base. At the squadron operations desk, you F-16 pilot Capt. Craig Borgstrom took a terse phone call from NEADS. ‘The guy from sector asked me, ‘How many can you get airborne right now?’’ Borgstrom recalls. ‘I told him I had two on battle stations. He then said, ‘That’s not what I asked. How many total airplanes can you send up?’ I said, ‘I’ll give you three.’ And he said, ‘Then go!’… The active air scramble order had been given. It was 9:24…”

One key element to promoting the 9/11 Commission’s narrative of the Langley scramble was getting two of the four top military officials who testified against it to flip flop – NORAD Commander General Eberhart and NORAD Continental Commander Major General Arnold. (Air Force Vice Commander Colonel William Scott and Air Force Secretary General Craig McKinley did not overtly flip flop).

Recall from an earlier chapter that in October of 2001 Eberhart testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, stating:

“I show it as 9:24 that we were notified [of Flight 77]… we were working that with the FAA and we launched the airplanes out of Langley Air Force Base as soon as they notified us about hijacking… United Airlines flight 93 in Pennsylvania…we were trying to decide, initially, if that flight was going to continue west and if there was some other target for that flight…”

However, in his 9/11 Commission interview two and a half years later, the staff presented its new narrative that NORAD never learned of Flights 77 or 93 before they crashed and the Langley scramble had been in response to phantom Flight 11. In so doing, the 9/11 Commission asserted that virtually all previous testimony by NORAD officials had been false testimony to congress – an imprisonable crime. It is understandable why Eberthart might have been motivated to change his story.

Eberhart complied beautifully, stating that he “had no knowledge of the circumstance that initiated the scramble of the Langley fighters” at 9:24 and “was only made aware of the [false rumor about Flight 11] recently.” He further said that “Delta 1989 and UAL 93 may have been interchanged.”

Thus, the head of NORAD claimed to have been ignorant for two and a half years about what precipitated the Langley scramble and when and how the agency was notified of the Flights 77 and 93. Eberhart was then invited to testify of his agreement with the new narrative when the 9/11 Commission presented it to the public for the first time (via Lead Staff Investigator John Farmer and Executive Director Philip Zelikow) during its final June of 2004 public hearing.

The staff presented the same narrative to Major General Arnold. As we saw in an earlier section, Arnold gave highly specific first-hand accounts – both in 9/11 Commission testimony and in the Air Force history – of being warned by the FAA of Flights 77 and 93, initiating the scramble in response, and tracking every movement of Flight 93 in real-time along with three NEADS sector Commanders – Colonels Robert Marr, John Cromwell, and Larry Kemp. Marr corroborated Arnold perfectly in his 9/11 Commission interview (as did Marr’s subordinate, Lt. Jeremey Powell, who executed Marr’s scrambled order) and in the Air Force history. The 9/11 Commission never bothered to interview Cromwell and Kemp.

Nevertheless, Arnold also complied beautifully as well. The memorandum from his February of 2004 staff interview stated:

“Commission staff explained to Arnold the time line for UAL 93, and he responded by acknowledging that the story on UAL 93 as he presented it was not based on fact. And he acknowledged that he may have spoken based on what he thought, but not based on what was actually ongoing.”

Like Eberhart, Arnold was then invited to testify of his agreement with the new narrative the following June. When Commissioner Ben-Veniste confronted him about his previous testimony not harmonizing with the new narrative, Arnold replied:

“I didn’t recall those facts in May of last year… In fact… the question that came to me was, why did we scramble… the F-16s out of Langley Air Force Base? And there had been statements made by some that we scrambled that aircraft the report of American 77, which was not the case… And I was trying to remember in my own mind what was it that persuaded us to scramble those aircraft. And I thought at the time it was United 93.”

The only top NORAD witness whose interview memorandum contained no evidence of a flip-flop was Colonel William Scott. The memorandum stated:

“Scott noted that when he built the brief for the Commission… he checked to make sure that the NORAD timeline and the NEADS… RADS [Reporting and Data System] data that he originally used were still the official sources of information… he trusted NORAD to have the larger, more accurate time…”

“Scott explained that General Arnold indicated to him prior to the Commission hearing that he recalled information on AA 77 that led to the Langley scramble.”

“Scott has no knowledge that the Langley scramble had any connection to AA 11…”

Scott was not invited to the June of 2004 public hearing.

General Craig McKinley’s interview memorandum did not contain overt denials of the NORAD timeline he testified to. But it did contain statements to the effect that the 9/11 Commission’s new narrative should be trusted. For example, it stated:

“McKinley noted that he never had knowledge of the transcript of the NEADS Mission Crew Commander (MCC) Op Channel 2 [allegedly attributing the Langley scramble solely to the phantom Flight 11] that was presented to him by Commission staff.”

“McKinley noted that the best data was likely the NEADS data that already been collected by Commission staff.

McKinley was also not invited to the June 2004 public hearing.

Sources:
Leslie Filson, 2003, “Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission,” pgs. 59, 63, 71-73, published by Tyndall Air Force Base Public Affairs Office
New York Times, 9/7/2011, “Newly Published Audio Provides Real-Time View of 9/11 Attacks”
Newhouse News, 1/25/2002, “Amid Crisis Simulation, ‘We Were Suddenly No-Kidding Under Attack’”
Newsday, 9/23/2001, “Air Attack on Pentagon Indicates Weaknesses”
Rutgers University Law Review, 9/7/2011, “Full Audio Transcript”
Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton, 2007, “Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission,” pgs. 85-88
U.S. Congress, 10/25/2001, “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Role of Defense Department in Homeland Security” (Transcript: NORAD Commander Eberhart Testimony)
Vanity Fair, 10/17/2006, “9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes”
9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003, Public Hearing (Transcript: Colonel William Scott, Major General Craig McKinley, Major General Larry Arnold Testimonies)
9/11 Commission, 9/22/2003, “Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview with Collin Scoggins, Military Operations Specialist.”
9/11 Commission, 10/27/2003, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of Lt. Jeremy Powell”
9/11 Commission, 1/23/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of NEADS Commander Colonel Robert Marr”
9/11 Commission, 2/3/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Craig McKinley”
9/11 Commission, 2/3/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of Major General Larry Arnold”
9/11 Commission, 2/4/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of Colonel William [also William] Scott”
9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with CINC NORAD (Commander in Chief NORAD), General Edward “Ed” Eberhart”
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, Public Hearing (Transcript: General Eberhart, Major General Larry Arnold Testimonies)
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, Public Hearing (Transcript: Remarks by Lead Staff Investigator John Farmer, Executive Director Philip Zelikow, Commissioner Ben-Veniste)
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pgs. 26-27, 34, 458 (Footnote 116)
9/11 Commission, 7/29/2004, untitled letter from the Commissioners and Executive Director Philip Zelikow to DoD Inspector General Joseph Schmitz and DoT Inspector General Kenneth Mead (Requesting investigations into the cause of public statements made by NORAD and FAA officials deemed by the 9/11 Commission to be false)