CHAPTER 11 - BRIGADIER GENERAL WINFIELD
Summary
Army Brigadier General Montague Winfield (ABC-Winfield) and acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers (Myers) gave detailed firsthand accounts of Winfield serving as the NMCC Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) while tracking and preparing to shoot Flight 93 as it approached Washington D.C. on presidential authorization that was passed from Vice President Cheney. Their accounts harmonized with news reports by ABC and CNN, as well as the official JPAC (Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command) military website.
However, the 9/11 Commission rejected this narrative and instead accepted the word of Winfield’s backup Captain Charles Joseph Leidig (Com-Leidig MFR+Test) and his assistant Commander Patrick Gardner (Com-Gardner MFR) that Leidig filled in for Winfield even though there was no corroborating entry in the DDO Pass Down Log (Com-Winfield MFR). As to why he filled in for Winfield, Leidig ridiculously claimed that Winfield could not be disturbed during the 9/11 attacks because he was in an important meeting to discuss Air Force officer ratings (Com-Leidig MFR, Com-NMCC Site Visit MFR).
The 9/11 Commission classified its staff interview with Winfield in which they asked him about his detailed firsthand account on ABC news, the NMCC’s awareness of Flight 93, and why there was no DDO Pass Down Log entry (Com-Winfield MFR). The 9/11 Commission then invited only Leidig and not Winfield to the public unveiling of its new narrative that the military never learned of Flight 93’s hijacking pre-impact so Leidig could formalize his endorsement of it (Com-Leidig Test).
Sources:
ABC News, 9/11/2002, “9/11: Interviews by Peter Jennings”
CNN, 9/4/2002, “‘The Pentagon Goes to War’: National Military Command Center”
General Richard Myers, 2009, “Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security,” pg. 151-152
U.S. Military; JPAC (Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command) Website, 10/11/2004, “Brigadier General W. Montague ‘Que’ Winfield, Commander, JPAC”
9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003, “Memorandum for the Record: Orientation and Tour of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)”
9/11 Commission, 4/26/2004, “WITHDRAWL NOTICE; ACCESS RESTRICTED; General Winfield Interviews, Handwritten Notes”
9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, U.S.N., Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy”
9/11 Commission, 5/5/2004 and 5/12/2004, Handwritten Notes of interview with Commander Patrick Gardner
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, “Statement of Capt. Charles J. Leidig, Jr., Commandant of Midshipmen United States Naval Academy before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States”
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, “9/11 Commission Public Hearing” (transcript)
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pg. 37
9/11 Commission Rejects Evidence That Winfield Was NMCC DDO During Flight 93 Approach, Ridiculously Claims Backup Filled In So As To Not Interrupt Important Meeting
On 9/11, the National Military Command Center’s (NMCC’s) Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) was Army Brigadier General (BG) Montague Winfield. Per the 9/11 Commission Report, the DDO’s role was “to gather the relevant parties and establish the chain of command between the National Command Authority – the president and the secretary of defense – and those who need to carry out their orders.”
For nearly two years following 9/11, news reports and public statements by Winfield indicated that he fulfilled his duties as DDO during the attacks. For example, on September 4th, 2002, CNN ran a 9/11 documentary in which Pentagon correspondent Barbara Starr stated:
“Brigadier General Montague Winfield was in command of the military's worldwide nerve center that morning… at 9:38, American Airlines Flight 77 slams into the Pentagon. The Command Center is on the other side of the massive building. Winfield and his staff never feel the impact. They see the flames on television as alarms go off inside. Smoke soon reaches the Command Center. Still, the Command Center remains icy calm. Winfield is running a secure phone call with the White House, the FAA, and the North American Air Defense Command, NORAD.”
Winfield, who was interviewed for the documentary, then stated:
“NORAD ordered all aircraft to battle stations and combat ready… [Flight 93 turning off its transponder and deviating course toward high value targets] is almost the exact same scenario that the other three hijackings had followed.”
Likewise, a September 11, 2002 ABC News special portrayed Winfield as leading NMCC operations for the entirety of the attacks and included numerous clips of an interview with him. Regarding the time period just after the second WTC impact, Winfield stated:
“When the second aircraft flew into the second Tower, it was at that point that we realized that… [this was] a coordinated terrorist attack on the United States…. The senior military and civilian leaders in the building began to filter into the National Military Command Center to get a situation update.”
Then, regarding the NMCC’s efforts to track and destroy Flight 93, Winfield stated:
“We received the report from the FAA that Flight 93 had turned off its transponder, had turned, and was now heading towards Washington, DC. The decision was made to try to go intercept Flight 93. The Vice President briefed into the conference that the President had given us permission to shoot down innocent civilian aircraft that threatened Washington, DC. …We started receiving reports from the fighters that were heading to, to intercept. The FAA kept us informed with their time estimates as the aircraft got closer and closer… the closure time came and went, and nothing had happened… everything was very tense in the NMCC. We had basically lost situational awareness of where this airplane was. It was about, you know, 10:03 that the fighters reported that Flight 93 had crashed.”
Similarly, General Richard Myers, acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9/11, stated in his 2009 book regarding events shortly after the Pentagon was struck:
“Army Brig. Gen. Montague Winfield was the duty officer in charge of the center that morning… he was participating in a conference call linking the NMCC, North American Aerospace Command (NORAD), and the White House… We learned that there was apparently a fourth hijacked aircraft, United Airlines 93… ‘NORAD estimates the aircraft is headed toward Washington,’ Winfield said. ‘Vice President Cheney has forwarded the President’s authorization to go Weapons Free [permission to shoot down] if that plane is confirmed hijacked and threatens the White House or the Capitol.’”
Finally, as of October of 2004, Winfield’s biographical statement on the official JPAC (Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command) military website stated:
“Brigadier General Winfield served as the Deputy Director for Operations… in the National Military Command Center. He was present as the General Officer in Charge during the terrorist attacks of 9/11.”
However, on July 21, 2003, nine key 9/11 Commission staff members, including Executive Director Philip Zelikow, were given an orientation and tour of the NMCC during which they were told for the first time that Winfield’s backup, Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, served as the DDO during the first phase of 9/11 attacks. The memorandum from the tour stated:
“Captain Leidig was the primary DDO during the initial phase of the NMCC’s reaction to events as they unfolded; BG Winfield transitioned into the position upon his return to the NMCC.”
Almost a year later, on April 29, 2004, Leidig was finally interviewed by five staff members. The preamble of the interview memorandum stated that Leidig filled in for Winfield because he was in another meeting to discuss performance ratings for Air Force officers. The preamble further stated that Winfield was not notified to return to the NMCC because “such meetings are generally not disturbed unless the reason is significant.” This unbelievable statement begged the question, what could have been more significant than a coordinated terrorist attack on the nation? The preamble stated:
“On 9/11 Captain Leidig was the action Deputy Director for Operations (DDO)… He was sitting in place of… Brigadier General Montague Winfield, USA, who was attending a meeting… The meeting was a USAF-convened session for general officers who rated Air Force officers… Such meetings are generally not disturbed unless the reason is significant.”
Likewise, the aforementioned staff orientation/tour memorandum stated:
“Army BG Winfield… was at an unrelated, closed-door personnel meeting convened by the Air Force to discuss the rating of Air Force officers.”
In the main body of the memorandum, Leidig said Winfield took over as the DDO “at some point in relation to the report of the Pennsylvania crash.” 9/11 Commission staff members also held two interviews in May of 2004 with the assistant DDO, Commander Patrick Gardner, who was also present in the NMCC on 9/11. Gardner likewise said Leidig served as the Acting DDO.
In April of 2004, the 9/11 Commission staff also interviewed Brigadier General Winfield and apparently asked him several pertinent questions, including:
Actions taken by the NMCC between the second WTC strike at 9:03 and the Pentagon strike at 9:37
The NMCC’s awareness of Flight 93
His interview with ABC News
Why there were no 9/11 entries in the “DDO Pass Down Log”
Unfortunately, his interview memorandum was replaced with an “ACCESS RESTRICTED” withdrawal notice and a list of questions that he was asked in his interview.
Finally, at the June 17, 2004 9/11 Commission hearing, Chairman Thomas Kean introduced Leidig to the public for the first time as having “served as deputy director of operations in the National Military Command Center on 9/11.” The same day Leidig provided a statement to the Commission, which read:
“On 10 September 2001, Brigadier General Winfield, U. S. Army, asked that I stand a portion of his duty as Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC, on the following day. I agreed and relieved Brigadier General Winfield at 0830 on 11 September 2001.”
Sources:
ABC News, 9/11/2002, “9/11: Interviews by Peter Jennings”
CNN, 9/4/2002, “‘The Pentagon Goes to War’: National Military Command Center”
General Richard Myers, 2009, “Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security,” pg. 151-152
U.S. Military; JPAC (Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command) Website, 10/11/2004, “Brigadier General W. Montague ‘Que’ Winfield, Commander, JPAC”
9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003, “Memorandum for the Record: Orientation and Tour of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC)”
9/11 Commission, 4/26/2004, “WITHDRAWL NOTICE; ACCESS RESTRICTED; General Winfield Interviews, Handwritten Notes”
9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, U.S.N., Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy”
9/11 Commission, 5/5/2004 and 5/12/2004, Handwritten Notes of interview with Commander Patrick Gardner
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, “Statement of Capt. Charles J. Leidig, Jr., Commandant of Midshipmen United States Naval Academy before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States”
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, “9/11 Commission Public Hearing” (transcript)
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pg. 37