CHAPTER 13 - DEFENSE SECRETARY RUMSFELD
Summary
The 9/11 Commission accepted Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s testimony that he chose not to report to the NMCC or coordinate a military response for nearly an hour and a half (Com-Rumsfeld Test, Com-pg. 38) after realizing America was under attack (CBS-Rumsfeld), despite knowing no fighter jets could be launched (New York Observer, Com-pg. 17-18) and no commercial airlines could be shot down without his approval (Com-pg. 17). Instead, he continued a routine briefing (Com-Rumsfeld Test, Com-pg. 37), resisted calls to action by his staff (Pentagon-V. Clarke), and jeopardized himself and the nation’s security apparatus by going out to the Pentagon crash site after the Flight 77 crash (Pentagon-Jester, NYT, Com-pg. 37).
However, White House Terrorism Advisor Richard Clarke (Clarke), Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Robert Andrews (Naval Postgraduate School- Andrews), Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz (Pentagon-Wolfowitz), and Army Secretary Thomas White (PBS-White) all said Rumsfeld was engaged in the military’s response much earlier via a teleconference studio near his office and/or the NMCC. Clarke and Wolfowitz specifically said he was involved in tracking and preparing to shoot down Flight 93.
Sources:
CBS, 9/8/2002, “Face the Nation”, interview with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
Drs. Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, 4/19/2001, “Pentagon Attack Interview with Paul Wolfowitz” (transcript)
Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7/2/2002, “Interview with Victoria Clark”
Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 10/19/2001, “Interview with John Jester”
Naval Post Graduate School Newsletter, Volume 1, Issue 10, September 2004, “Special Operations Policy Expert and Veteran Robert Andrews Gives Distinguished Visiting Guest Lectures at NPS”
New York Observer, 6/21/2004, “9/11 Tapes Reveal Ground Personnel Muffled Attacks”
New York Times, 3/25/2007, “First Chapter: ‘Rumsfeld’,” by Andrew Cockburn
PBS Frontline, 10/26/2004, “Rumsfeld’s War”
Richard Clarke, March 2004, “Against All Enemies”
9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004, Public Hearing (Transcript: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld Testimony)
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pgs. 17-18, 37-38
9/11 Commission Rejects Evidence Rumsfeld Joined White House Teleconference Early and Was Involved In Flight 93 Shootdown Prep; Accepts Rumsfeld’s Self-Implicating Testimony That He Did Not Engage In Military Response for 1.5 Hours
After the 2nd plane hit the South Tower at 9:03 AM, it was generally understood by top military officials that America was under attack. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told CBS’ Face the Nation:
“When the second plane hit the World Trade Center, it became clear that it was more than an accident.”
At this moment, Rumsfeld’s role in coordinating a response was central. According to the New York Times (3/25/2007) and the 9/11 Commission Report, he and President Bush (who was out of state and did not have situational awareness) were the only individuals with “National Command Authority”. This meant only Rumsfeld and President Bush had authority to shoot down a civilian aircraft. Page 17 of the 9/11 Commission Report stated:
“Prior to 9/11, it was understood that an order to shoot down a commercial aircraft would have to be issued by the National Command Authority (a phrase used to describe the president and secretary of defense).”
Furthermore, as the New York Observer pointed out, about three months before 9/11, the Bush administration rescinded NORAD commanders’ decades-long unilateral authority to launch fighter jets when faced with an air-defense threat. Instead, the administration required that launching fighters first be approved by the Defense Secretary. The 9/11 Commission Report explained:
“As they existed on 9/11, the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government… FAA Headquarters in Washington… [would] contact the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC)… to ask for a military escort… The NMCC would then seek approval from… the Secretary of Defense… If approval was given, the orders would then be transmitted down NORAD’s chain of command.”
Nevertheless, fighters were scrambled in violation of these procedures (9/11 Commission Report pg. 29) when NORAD Continental Commander Major General Larry Arnold told NEADS Commander Colonel Robert Marr just before the first WTC impact to “go ahead and scramble them, and we’ll get authorities later.”
According to the official 9/11 narrative, despite understanding that the nation was under attack and that he was the sole person in Washington with National Command Authority, Donald Rumsfeld did not report to the NMCC or make any attempt to coordinate a military response. Instead, he went ahead with his regularly scheduled daily intelligence briefing. Citing Rumsfeld’s testimony from March of 2004, the 9/11 Commission report stated on page 37:
“The Secretary was informed of the second strike in New York during the [daily intelligence] briefing; he resumed the briefing while awaiting more information.”
Victoria Clarke (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs) and Larry Di Rita (Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense) tried to persuade Rumsfeld to cancel his schedule so he could respond to the attacks, but Rumsfeld was unwilling. Clark stated in her interview:
“[Larry Di Rita] and I went in to see the Secretary… we knew it was clearly a terrorist attack of some kind… we were saying, ‘…The command center is going to start getting spun up.’ He said something like, ‘Well, let's take a look at my schedule…’ Larry said, in effect, ‘Everything is coming off your schedule, this is your schedule today.’ …[but] He said something about getting his CIA brief, which he gets every morning, and indicated he would see us in the command center a bit later.”
Over half an hour later, Rumsfeld’s briefing was still dragging on when Flight 77 slammed into the opposite side of the Pentagon at 9:37. However, rather than finally reporting to the NMCC, Rumsfeld then exited the building and walked to the crash site, theoretically endangering himself and further delaying America’s ability to respond to the threat. Once again citing Rumsfeld’s testimony, the 9/11 Commission Report stated:
“After the Pentagon was struck, Secretary Rumsfeld went to the parking lot to assist with rescue efforts.”
In so doing, Rumsfeld ignored opposition from his security detail. John Jester, chief of the Defense Protective Service, which is responsible for Pentagon Security, later stated in an interview:
“The secretary went to the crash site, which he should not have done. One of my officers tried to stop him, and he just brushed him off. I told his staff that he should not have done that. He is in the national command authority…”
While Rumsfeld was at the crash site, the Command Center was frantically trying to locate him. A senior White House official who was in the Command Center was later quoted in the New York Times (8/25/2007) as stating angrily:
“What was Rumsfeld doing on 9/11? He deserted his post. He disappeared. The country was under attack. Where was the guy who controls America's defense? ...What if this had been the opening shot of a coordinated attack by a hostile power? Outrageous, to abandon your responsibilities and go off and do what you don't need to be doing…”
Also per the New York Times (8/25/2007), when Rumsfeld finally re-entered the Pentagon around 10:00 A.M., despite anxious pleas from the military, he still did not go to the NMCC. Instead, he went to his office to where he had one or more phone calls. One was with President Bush, although neither man could later recall specifically what they talked about. After the call(s), Rumsfeld again did not go to the NMCC, but instead went to a private conference room with his senior staff. Finally, at almost 10:30, Rumsfeld entered the NMCC at began to gain situational awareness of the 9/11 terrorist attacks that had long since concluded. Rumsfeld told the 9/11 Commission:
“I was back in the Pentagon… shortly before or after 10:00 a.m. On my return from the crash site and before going to the executive support center, I had one or more calls in my office, one of which was with the president.”
The 9/11 Commission Report on page 38 stated:
“At 9:44… [NMCC] staff reported that they were still trying to locate Secretary Rumsfeld… [who finally] joined… shortly before 10:30.”
The 9/11 Commission staff in Staff Statement No. 17 (quoted by the New York Times 6/18/2004) stated:
“The president spoke to Secretary Rumsfeld briefly sometime after 10:00, but no one can recall any content beyond a general request to alert forces. The president and the secretary did not discuss the use of force against hijacked airliners in this conversation.”
A book written by prolific political journalist/author Andrew Cockburn and quoted by the New York Times in March of 2007 stated:
“Rumsfeld was back in the building by ten o'clock, but despite the anxious pleas from the military, he did not go to the command center. Instead, he headed for his office, where he spoke to President Bush, though afterward neither man could recall what they discussed. Next… he moved to… the Executive Support Center… right next door to the military command center.”
“Waiting here was a small group… [Defense Under Secretary] Stephen Cambone… [Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense] Larry Di Rita… [Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs] Victoria (Torie) Clarke… After a brief discussion with this select group, Rumsfeld finally made his way to the military command center. It was almost 10:30. Only then, as he later explained to the 9/11 Commission, did he begin to gain ‘situational awareness’ of what was going on.”
Nevertheless, Rumsfeld insisted his behavior should not have been construed as unusual or irresponsible. He testified to the 9/11 Commission:
“The Department of Defense… did not have responsibility for the borders. It did not have responsibility for the airports… And the fact that I might not have known something ought not to be considered unusual. Our task was to be oriented out of this country…and to defend against attacks from abroad. And a civilian aircraft was a law enforcement matter to be handled by law enforcement authorities and aviation authorities. And that is the way our government was organized and arranged. So those questions you’re posing… ought to be asked of people who had the statutory responsibility for those things.”
However, other authoritative sources gave entirely different accounts of Donald Rumsfeld’s whereabouts during the 9/11 attacks. In the early pages of his March of 2004 book, “Against All Enemies,” White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke wrote that Rumsfeld was present when he initiated the White House teleconference shortly after the second plane struck the World Trade Center. The 9/11 Commission Report said on page 36 that this teleconference started at 9:25, although Clark’s account seems to put earlier. Regardless, wrote:
“As I entered the Video Center … I could see people rushing into studios around the city: Donald Rumsfeld at Defense and George Tenet at CIA.”
After the Pentagon was hit, Clarke wrote:
“[I could] still see Rumsfeld on the screen… smoke was getting into the Pentagon secure teleconferencing studio… Franklin Miller urged [Rumsfeld] to helicopter to DOD’s alternate site… [to which Rumsfeld replied:] ‘I am too goddam old to go to an alternate site.’ …[Instead] Rumsfeld moved to another studio in the Pentagon.”
The 9/11 Commission made no mention of Clarke’s account, did not seek to re-interview him when his book was released four months before its report was finished, and did not cite any transcript or recording of the teleconference.
Another source is Robert Andrews, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations on 9/11, whose account matches Clarke’s. In the September 2004 issue of the Naval Post Graduate School Newsletter, Clarke told his interviewer:
“The moment I saw the second plane strike ‘live’, I knew Secretary Rumsfeld would need the most up-to-date information, and ran down to our counterterrorism center to get maps of New York and other data to take to him in the Executive Support Center. I was there in the Support Center with the Secretary when he was talking to (White House Counterterrorism Advisor Richard) Clarke on the White House video-teleconference, and to the President.”
A third source is Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense on 9/11. In April of 2002, he gave an interview to Dr. Alfred Goldberg and Dr. Rebecca Cameron, who were performing government-funded research for the Department of Defense’s 2007 publication Pentagon 9/11. During the interview, Wolfowitz also said Rumsfeld left his office immediately after the second World Trade Center impact. He further said that he was only outside the Pentagon less than ten minutes after the Flight 77 impact, at which point he went to the NMCC and Donald Rumsfeld was already discussing what to do about Flight 93. He stated:
“We [Donald Rumsfeld and I] had breakfast that morning with a group of congressmen… We saw the second tower hit, and Rumsfeld, for some reason, had the presence of mind to go out of his office… We went on with our meeting, and suddenly the whole Building shook [from the Pentagon attack]… [We went outside] away from the Building. Then I got word to come back in, which I was eager to do… it was less than ten minutes… We went into the NMCC, where the Secretary was… One issue was what to do about the plane over Pennsylvania, getting orders to get fighters up to intercept it, and the Secretary getting approval from the President to shoot it down.”
However, General Myers contradicted Wolfowitz on the last point. He asserted that Rumsfeld was still not in the NMCC when the south tower of the World Trade Center collapsed at 9:59. In his 2009 memoir, Myers stated:
“…I went to find Secretary Rumsfeld. As I left the Current Actions Center, CNN showed the south tower of the World Trade Center collapsing [at 9:59] in an avalanche of smoke and debris… One of Rumsfeld’s aides told me he was ‘outside,’ helping with the wounded. I left word that I was returning to the NMCC.”
In any event, the breakfast meeting Wolfowitz referenced appears to have been the same one attended by General Myers and spoken of by Army Secretary Thomas White in his October of 2004 PBS Frontline. As a reminder, White stated:
“Don Rumsfeld had a breakfast, and virtually every one of the senior officials of the Department of Defense – service chiefs, secretary, deputy, everybody, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [General Myers]. And as that breakfast was breaking up, the first plane had hit the World Trade tower.”
Sources:
ABC News, 9/11/2002, “9/11: Interviews by Peter Jennings”
ABC, 9/12/2002, “Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with John McWethy”
Andrew Cockburn (political author, journalist, Harper’s Magazine Washington D.C. editor), 2007, “Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy” (first chapter carried by the New York Times)
CBS, 9/8/2002, “Face the Nation”, interview with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
CNN, 8/17/2002, “America Remembers, Part 1”
CNN, 9/4/2002, “‘The Pentagon Goes to War’: National Military Command Center”
CNN, 3/23/2004, transcript: “Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Myers Testify Before 9/11 Commission”
Drs. Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, 4/19/2001, “Pentagon Attack Interview with Paul Wolfowitz” (transcript)
FAA Regulations, Hijacked Aircraft, Order 7110.65M, para. 10-2-6 (2001)
FAA Regulations, Special Military Operations, Requests for Service, Order 7610.4J, paras. 7-1-1, 7-1-2 (2001); DOD memo, CJCS instruction, “Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects,” June 1, 2001
Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7/2/2002, “Interview with Victoria Clark”
Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 10/19/2001, “Interview with John Jester”
Naval Post Graduate School Newsletter, Volume 1, Issue 10, September 2004, “Special Operations Policy Expert and Veteran Robert Andrews Gives Distinguished Visiting Guest Lectures at NPS”
New York Observer, 6/21/04, “9/11 Tapes Reveal Ground Personnel Muffled Attacks”
New York Times, 6/18/2004, “THREATS AND RESPONSES; Excerpts From Report on Orders to Shoot Down Planes on Sept. 11”
New York Times, 3/25/2007, “First Chapter: ‘Rumsfeld’,” by Andrew Cockburn
New York Times, 8/25/2007, “The Secretary We Had”
PBS Frontline, 10/26/2004, “Rumsfeld’s War”
Richard Clarke, March 2004, “Against All Enemies”
Richard Myers, 2009, “Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security,” pgs. 151-152
9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004, Public Hearing (Transcript: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld Testimony)
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pgs. 17-20, 37-38, 44, 458