CHAPTER 2 - THE 9/11 COMMISSION
Summary
(1) The Bush administration actively opposed an independent investigation into the 9/11 attacks, arguing that it would expose sensitive intelligence and interfere with the war on terror (CBS, CNN, Newsweek). It eventually succumbed to public pressure and agreed to the formation of the 9/11 Commission, which was comprised of ten bipartisan Commissioners headed by two Chairmen, and a research staff headed by an Executive Director (Time). The Commission was allocated a tiny budget ($3 million) and a short timeline (18 months) (Time), which later prompted both Chairmen to say that it was set up to fail (CBC, C-SPAN). President Bush and Vice President Cheney both refused to speak to the Commissioners publicly or on the record (CBS, NYT).

(2) In 2008, New York Times investigative journalist Philip Shenon wrote a book entitled, “The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation,” which was subsequently covered by numerous media outlets. This worked it cited frequently hereafter. Philip Zelikow was appointed the Executive Director of the Commission. Zelikow was a member of Bush’s White House transition team (NYT) and had worked closely with White House National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice since the 1980s (AP). During the transition, Zelikow worked to demote perennial (since the 1980s) White House Terrorism Advisor Richard Clarke and restrict his access to the president and his cabinet (ABC, AP, Clarke, Guardian, Shenon (NYT journalist), UPI, WAPO), despite having two years earlier written about the possibility of a terrorism attack destroying the World Trade Center towers followed by an erosion of civil liberties and a ramp-up in government surveillance of citizens (Foreign Affairs). Zelikow also authored the administration’s war on terror declaration and the Bush preemptive war doctrine, which became the primary justification for the Iraq War (C-SPAN, NYT Mag, Shenon, WAPO).

(3) None of Zelikow’s links to Rice or the Bush administration was included on his resume for the Executive Director position or disclosed at the time of his appointment (ABC, AP, Guardian, Shenon). When these links were later discovered, both the Commission staff and the victims’ relatives called for his removal. However, the Chairmen only agreed to recuse him from a small slice of the investigation (NTY, Shenon). The Commission staff jested about how Zelikow’s conflicts of interest could possibly be any more glaring and he was often perceived by them of trying to shield the White House from criticism (AP, Shenon).

(4) Zelikow exercised full control over who to hire for staff and all communications between the staff and the Commissioners. He developed a complete outline of the final report after three months even though the investigation had barely begun (Shenon). He also regularly broke the formal ban against private phone calls with top White House officials and then ordered his assistant not to log the calls (AP, Shenon).

(5) Despite months of subpoena warnings in 2003, the administration withheld intelligence documents from most of the Commissioners and instead only provided vetted summary notes (AP, NYT). The Commissioners again threatened subpoena in 2004 when the administration withheld copies of the President’s pre-9/11 daily intelligence briefs. However, Zelikow worked 48 straight hours to prepare White House-vetted summary notes in lieu of the briefs themselves, which the Commissioners accepted under pressure from the administration, to the victims’ families’ dismay (Shenon).

(6) In December of 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence completed a report on enhanced CIA interrogation techniques used on 9/11 detainees and publicly released an executive summary despite CIA resistance. The techniques included simulated drowning, medically unnecessary “rectal feeding,” being forced to remain awake for up to 7.5 days straight while shackled standing up, being kept naked and in total darkness and isolation for days at a time with occasional ice baths and beatings, being tied tightly into painful positions for hours at a time with the bonds tightened every hour, being severely beaten while wearing hoods, being forced to stand on broken limbs for hours at a time, being threatened with the rape and murder of parents and children, being forced to unwittingly participate in mock executions and games of Russian Roulette, and being forced into extremely small spaces (sometimes filled with insects) for long time periods (ABC (12/9/2014), Guardian (12/9/2014), NBC x2 (12/9/2014)). Several of these techniques were used on Khalid Sheik Mohammed, whose testimony was most central to the official 9/11 narrative (NBC (12/9/2014)).

The Senate Select Committee concluded that the enhanced interrogation techniques were either useless or counterproductive in convincing detainees to reveal accurate information that they would have otherwise withheld (NBC (12/9/2014)). Several detainees confessed outright to telling interrogators whatever they thought they wanted to hear to make the interrogations stop. At least one detainee was told the interrogations would not stop until he signed a confession he was not even allowed to read (NBC News (1/30/2008)).

The Senate report also found that the CIA for years justified the enhanced interrogation techniques to Congress, the Justice Department, the press, and the public with false information about the results it yielded. Furthermore, the CIA actively opposed national security by disallowing access to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and other high-value detainees by the FBI, Congress, the State Department, the 9/11 Commission, the Director of National Intelligence, and even the CIA’s own inspector general. This was despite FBI Director Robert Mueller insisting such access would help the FBI understand threats to U.S. cities (NBC x2 (12/9/2014)).

Testimony extracted using the CIA’s methods is not legally admissible in courtrooms due to the likelihood of false confessions. Therefore, the CIA detainees were ineligible to be criminally prosecuted (NBC News (1/30/2008), LAT (6/5/2008), MSNBC, 10/24/2006, LAT (6/5/2008)). Both Vice President Cheney (LAT, 12/16/2008, CBS News, 12/16/2008) and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld (MSNBC, 10/24/2006) personally approved the interrogation methods.

All of this is devastating to the credibility of the 9/11 Commission Report. 441 of the 9/11 Commission final report’s 1700-plus footnotes were based on the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques. The 441 footnotes served as the foundation for the report’s most crucial three chapters, which covered initial planning, hijacker arrivals into the United States, and execution of the attacks (NBC News (1/30/2008)). The Senate report likewise called into question the accuracy of the 9/11 Commission report (NBC (12/9/2014)). However, the 9/11 Commission Report did not mention the suspect interrogation methods or the doubtful reliability of the responses they elicited (Newsweek, 3/13/2009).

CIA Director Tenet, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, the Justice Department, and the White House refused to allow the 9/11 Commission access to the detainees or even to observe them being questioned through one-way glass. The CIA refused to answer the 9/11 Commission’s questions about how they assessed the credibility of the detainees’ responses (NYT (12/8/2007, 1/2/2008)). Furthermore, the CIA destroyed several 92 tapes of detainees being interrogated years after telling the 9/11 Commission it turned over all material related to the interrogations (NYT (12/8/2007), Newsweek (3/13/2009)), which prompted the Chairmen to call for a criminal probe (NYT (1/2/2008)).

The Guantanamo Bay translator used in the interrogations failed his basic translator proficiency exam. However, public testimony of this fact in court was said to jeopardize national security and thus disallowed (USA Today (11/26/2006)). Further, Al Qaeda spies infiltrated the Pentagon’s Islamic chaplaincy and translator programs and gained access to 9/11 detainees (ABC News (9/29/2003), MSNBC (10/23/2003), NBC (10/23/2003), Newsweek (10/1/2003)).

(1) Sources:
C-SPAN, 9/11/2006 (9/11 Commission Vice Chairman Thomas Kean Press Conference)
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 8/21/2006, “9/11: Truth, Lies and Conspiracy,” (Interview with 9/11 Commission Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton)
CBS News, 5/15/2002, “Bush Opposes 9/11 Query Panel”
CBS News, 4/28/2004, “Bush & Cheney, Behind Closed Door”
CNN, 1/29/2002, “Bush Asks Daschle to Limit Sept. 11 Probes”
New York Times, 4/28/2004, “Bush-Cheney 9/11 Interview Won’t Be Formally Recorded”
Newsweek, 2/3/2002, “The Battle Back Home”
Time Magazine, 3/26/2003, “9-11 Commission Funding Woes” 

(2) Sources:
ABC News, 4/8/2004, “Point Proved” Richard Clarke interviewed by Peter Jennings
ABC News, 1/30/2008, “Ex-9/11 Panel Chief Denies Secret White House Ties”
Associated Press, 2/4/2008, “Book: 911 Commission Executive Director Had Closer White House Ties Than Publicly Disclosed”
Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998, “Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger,” co-authored by Philip D. Zelikow
Guardian, 3/25/2004, “Bush’s Brand New Enemy is the Truth: Clarke’s Claims Have Shaken the White House to its Foundations”
New York Times, 3/20/2004, “Clinton Aids Plan to Tell of Warning to Bush Team on Qaeda”
Philip Shenon (New York Times investigative journalist), 2008, “The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation,” pgs. 40-41, 63-65
United Press International, 4/9/2004, “9/11 Panel Director ‘Helped Demote Clark’”
Richard Clarke, 2004, “Against All enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror,” pgs. 230-231
Washington Post, 1/20/2002, “A Strategy’s Cautious Evolution” (This article has been removed from the Washington Post’s archives.)
Washington Post, 2/4/2008, “The White House Mole” 

(3) Sources:
ABC News, 1/30/2008, “Ex-9/11 Panel Chief Denies Secret White House Ties”
Associated Press, 2/4/2008, “Book: 911 Commission Executive Director Had Closer White House Ties Than Publicly Disclosed”
New York Times, 3/20/2004, “Clinton Aids Plan to Tell of Warning to Bush Team on Qaeda”
Philip Shenon (New York Times investigative journalist), 2008, “The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation,” pgs. 40-41

(4) Sources:
Associated Press, 2/4/2008, “Book: 911 Commission Executive Director Had Closer White House Ties Than Publicly Disclosed”
Philip Shenon (New York Times investigative journalist), 2008, “The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation,” pgs. 69-70, 81-86, 107, 171-172, 388-389 

(5) Sources:
Associated Press, 11/13/2003, “9/11 Panel to Get Access to Withheld Data”
New York Times, 10/26/2003, “9/11 Commission Could Subpoena Oval Office Files”
Philip Shenon (New York Times investigative journalist), 2008, “The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation,” pgs. 224-225 

(6) Sources:
ABC News, 9/29/2003, “Pentagon Reviewing Va. Chaplain School”
ABC News, 12/9/2014, “CIA Torture Report: The Most Stunning Findings”
CBS News, 12/16/2008, “Cheney Was Key in Clearing CIA Interrogation Tactics”
Guardian, 12/9/2014, “Rectal Rehydration and Waterboarding: the CIA Torture Report's Grisliest Findings”
Los Angeles Times, 5/4/2006, “No Trials for Key Players”
Los Angeles Times, 6/5/2008, “Officer Calls Sept. 11 Cases Tainted”
Los Angeles Times, 12/16/2008, “Cheney OK’s Harsh CIA Tactics”
MSNBC, 10/23/2003, “Countdown with Keith Olberman,” John Loftus interview
MSNBC, 10/24/2006, “Can the ‘20th Hijacker’ of Sept. 11 Stand Trial?”
NBC News, 10/23/2003, “Muslim Leader with D.C. Ties Indicted”
NBC News, 1/30/2008, “9/11 Commission Controversy”
NBC News, 12/9/2014, “‘Rectal Hydration’: Inside the CIA's Interrogation of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed”
NBC News, 12/9/2014, “Senate Report Finds CIA Interrogation Tactics Were Ineffective”
New York Times, 12/8/2007, “Congress Looks Into Obstruction as Calls for Justice Inquiry Rise”
New York Times, 1/2/2008, “Stonewalled by the C.I.A.”
Newsweek, 10/1/2003, “Who, and What, Does He Know?”
Newsweek, 3/13/2009, “The 9/11 Commission’s Blind Spot”
USA Today, 11/26/2006, “‘State Secret Privilege’ Blocks Fired Translator from Suing FBI”

Bush Administration Opposes the 9/11 Commission
The Bush administration initially opposed forming the 9/11 Commission. According to CBS News, the President argued that any investigation into 9/11 would necessarily deal with sensitive intelligence and should therefore be left to the congressional intelligence committees. According to CNN and Newsweek, Vice President Dick warned Democratic Senate majority leader Tom Daschle that any attempt to hold public hearings before other committees besides the intelligence committees would run the risk of “interfering with the [war on terror] mission.”

Per Time, the administration eventually succumbed to public pressure and agreed to the formation of the 9/11 Commission, which was comprised of ten bipartisan Commissioners headed by two Chairmen, and a research staff headed by an Executive Director. The 9/11 Commission initially was given just 3 million dollars and 18 months to investigate the largest terrorist attack on American soil in history. Republican Chairman Thomas Kean then requested more funds as part of President Bush’s $75 billion supplemental spending bill for the Iraq War, but the request was rejected. Eventually, the budget was increased to 12 million. For reference, the government spent over $50 million (per Time) investigating the Columbia Space Shuttle tragedy, which killed seven people, and over $40 million on the Monica Lewinsky scandal, per the Los Angeles Times. Speaking on C-SPAN and CBC, both 9/11 Commission Chairmen later stated that the Commission was set up to fail due to the lack of time and funds.

The New York Times reported that President Bush and Vice President Cheney refused to publicly testify before the Commission. Instead, they eventually agreed to meet with the Commission together, in private, not under oath, and not recorded. In September of 2011, ten years after the attacks, Reuters reported that a 30-page summary of the Commissioners’ interview with the President and Vice President was still sealed from public access. The administration also opposed letting National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice testify publicly before eventually acquiescing, according to CBS (4/28/2004).

Sources:
C-SPAN, 9/11/2006 (9/11 Commission Vice Chairman Thomas Kean Press Conference)
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 8/21/2006, “9/11: Truth, Lies and Conspiracy,” (Interview with 9/11 Commission Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton)
CBS News, 5/15/2002, “Bush Opposes 9/11 Query Panel”
CBS News, 4/28/2004, “Bush & Cheney, Behind Closed Door”
CNN, 1/29/2002, “Bush Asks Daschle to Limit Sept. 11 Probes”
Los Angeles Times, 10/29/1998, “Records Give Rare Glimpse Into Cost of Starr’s Probe”
New York Times, 4/28/2004, “Bush-Cheney 9/11 Interview Won’t Be Formally Recorded”
Newsweek, 2/3/2002, “The Battle Back Home”
Reuters, 9/8/2001, “National Archives Sits on 9/11 Commission Records”
Time Magazine, 3/26/2003, “9-11 Commission Funding Woes”

9/11 Commission Executive Director’s White House Ties Not Disclosed
Per the Associated Press, the Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, University of Virginia Professor Philip Zelikow, worked with Condoleezza Rice on the National Security Council in the 1980s and 1990s, published a book with Rice in 1995, and reported to Rice as a member of the pre-9/11 Bush transition team. (The article, which will be cited repeatedly in coming sections, was also carried or cited by numerous other outlets, such as the Seattle Times, Chicago Tribune, and Washington Post.) Per the New York Times, Zelikow even attended early intelligence briefings on the Al Qaeda terrorist threat, which meant it could have reflected on him personally if the Bush administration’s response to the threat was found to be inept. None of these links to Rice or the Bush administration was disclosed at the time of Zelikow’s appointment.

A thorough examination of Philip Zelikow’s actions on the 9/11 Commission is found in the 2008 book, “The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation,” authored by 20-plus year New York Times veteran political/military correspondent, Philip Shenon. The book was covered in news reports by ABC News and the Associated Press. This book will be cited regularly in coming sections.

Sources:
ABC News, 1/30/2008, “Ex-9/11 Panel Chief Denies Secret White House Ties”
Associated Press, 2/4/2008, “Book: 911 Commission Executive Director Had Closer White House Ties Than Publicly Disclosed”
Chicago Tribune, 2/4/2008, “Book: 9-11 Chief Had White House Ties”
New York Times, 3/20/2004, “Clinton Aids Plan to Tell of Warning to Bush Team on Qaeda”
Philip Shenon, 2008, “The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation,” pgs. 40-41
Seattle Time, 2/4/2008, “9/11 Director Had Links to Bush, Books Says”
Washington Post, 2/4/2008, “The White House Mole”

Zelikow Helps Demote Terrorism Advisor Richard Clarke Despite Having Warned of Major WTC Terrorist Attack Followed by Mass Surveillance
Per numerous media outlets (Guardian, UPI, ABC News (1/30/2008)), In January of 2001, during the Bush transition into the White House, Philip Zelikow recommended to Rice to downgrade terrorism advisor Richard Clarke’s position. At the time, Clarke was the U.S. government’s highest-ranking expert on Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda and he had served as a White House terrorism advisor with direct access to every president since Ronald Reagan. Rice agreed and implemented Zelikow’s recommendation. As a result, Clarke could no longer attend Cabinet-level meetings, send memos directly to the president, or easily interact with Cabinet-level officials, since he only reported to deputy secretaries.

Per the Washington Post (1/20/2002), days after Bush’s inauguration, Clarke submitted a comprehensive plan to Condoleezza Rice to deal with the “existential” Al Qaeda threat, which included ramping up U.S. intelligence funding and focus on the terrorist organization. The plan pointed out that there were currently Al Qaeda sleeper cells inside America and “attacks had almost certainly been set in motion.” This article has unfortunately been removed from the Washington Post’s archives. Per ABC News (4/8/2004), Clarke asked for a meeting with the President several times to discuss the plan, but was never allowed to do so before 9/11. ABC News (1/30/2008) also quoted Shenon as stating:

“[Zelikow] had laid the groundwork for much of what went wrong at the White House in the weeks and months before September 11.”

Per Shenon, when Clarke learned in early 2003 that Zelikow had been appointed Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, he remarked:

“The fix is in… there [is] no hope that the Commission would carry out an impartial investigation of the Bush administration’s bungling of terrorist threats in the months before September 11. Could anyone have a more obvious conflict of interest than Zelikow?”

Zelikow’s choice to deemphasize counterterrorism during the Bush transition was strange since, less than three years earlier, he co-authored an essay for Foreign Affairs magazine in which he warned that a major terrorist attack could strike the U.S. in the near future and usher in a new era of civil liberties curtailment to combat the threat. The essay even considered the destruction of the WTC towers, albeit via a nuclear attack. The article was entitled, “Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger.” It stated:

“Such an act of catastrophic terrorism would be a watershed event in American history… Like Pearl Harbor, this event would divide our past and future into a before and after. The United States might respond with draconian measures, scaling back civil liberties, allowing wider surveillance of citizens…”

Sources:
ABC News, 4/8/2004, “Point Proved” Richard Clarke interviewed by Peter Jennings
ABC News, 1/30/2008, “Ex-9/11 Panel Chief Denies Secret White House Ties”
Foreign Affairs, November/December 1998, “Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger,” co-authored by Philip D. Zelikow
Guardian, 3/25/2004, “Bush’s Brand New Enemy is the Truth: Clarke’s Claims Have Shaken the White House to its Foundations”
NBC News, 3/24/2004, “Committee Report on Policy Coordination”
New York Times, 3/20/2004, “Clinton Aids Plan to Tell of Warning to Bush Team on Qaeda”
Philip Shenon, 2008, “The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation,” pgs. 63-65
United Press International, 4/9/2004, “9/11 Panel Director ‘Helped Demote Clark’”
Richard Clarke, 2004, “Against All enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror,” pgs. 230-231
Washington Post, 1/20/2002, “A Strategy’s Cautious Evolution” (This article has been removed from the Washington Post’s archives.)
Washington Post, 3/24/2004, “9/11 Panel Told Terrorism Initially Not ‘Urgent’ for Bush” or “CIA Confused Whether It Could Kill Bin Laden”
9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004, “Committee Report on Policy Coordination: Panel Finds Plan to Take on Al Qaeda Stalled in Process”

Zelikow Authors the Bush Preemptive War Doctrine and the Declaration of War on Terror
In 2002, Condoleezza Rice instructed Zelikow to overhaul America’s national security strategy in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. In response, Zelikow completed a 31-page document entitled, “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” which the Bush administration submitted to Congress in September of 2002. The document introduced the “preemptive war doctrine,” also known as the “Bush Doctrine,” which reversed decades of U.S. military/foreign policy and became the primary justification for the Iraq War. Per the Washington Post, the document stated:

“In an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle. The United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”

The document also acted as the administration’s official declaration of the War on Terror, stating:

“The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism — premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”

In September of 2005, New York Times Magazine pointed out the vague, blank-check nature of this war declaration, stating:

“Not Islamic terrorism or Middle Eastern terrorism or even terrorism directed against the United States: terrorism itself. ‘Declaring war on “terror,”’ as one military strategist later remarked to me, ‘is like declaring war on air power.’” 

According to Shenon, Zelikow’s authorship of the era-defining document was not publicly revealed until well after he was appointed the Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission.

Sources:
C-SPAN, 3/4/2008, “After Words with Philip Shenon”
New York Times Magazine, 9/11/2005, “Taking Stock of the Forever War”
Philip Shenon, 2008, “The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation,” pgs. 128
Washington Post, 9/17/2002, “The National Security Strategy of the United States”

Zelikow White House Links Made Public, Is Partially Recused
According to Shenon, in October of 2003, shortly after 9/11 victims’ relatives called for his removal due to conflicts of interest, Zelikow was interviewed under oath by one of his 9/11 Commission subordinates about his role in the Bush National Security Council. The interview lasted 90 minutes and covered Richard Clarke’s demotion and Zelikow’s authorship of the preemptive war doctrine document, among other topics. The interviewer, lawyer Dan Marcus, noted that Zelikow’s résumé for the Executive Director position mentioned nothing about his work for the Bush administration and that Commission Chairmen Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton were blindsided by this. After the interview, Marcus and other staff members jokingly tried to imagine how Zelikow’s conflicts of interest could possibly be any more glaring.

Marcus recommended to the Chairmen that Zelikow be recused from the Commission’s investigation into anything having to do with the National Security Council, which would have effectively forced his resignation. The families of the 9/11 victims were strongly supportive of this move. The families were largely responsible for the formation of the Commission in the first place, against the President’s opposition, and had long been critical of Zelikow’s ties to the Bush administration. However, the Commission Chairmen only recused Zelikow from examining the Bush transition and interviewing Bush aides such as Condoleezza Rice – a relatively small slice of the investigation.

Per the Associated Press, in late 2003, 9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerrey threatened to quit after learning of Zelikow’s ties to Condoleezza Rice, his role in downgrading terrorism as a Bush administration priority, and his authorship of the Bush pre-emptive war doctrine. However, the Chairmen talked him out of quitting.

Also per the Associated Press, Zelikow was often perceived by members of his staff as seeking to shield the White House in general and Condoleezza Rice in particular from any serious criticism. ABC News, citing Shenon, said Zelikow blocked some of the staffers from submitting a report which described Rice’s performance as “amount[ing] to incompetence, or something not far from it.” In early 2004, per Shenon, staffer Warren Bass threatened to quit because he believed Zelikow was distorting his investigation to this end. He also complained that the White House was sabotaging his work by limiting his access to relevant documents. However, his team leader talked him out of quitting.

Source:
ABC News, 1/30/2008, “Ex-9/11 Panel Chief Denies Secret White House Ties”
Associated Press, 2/4/2008, “Book: 911 Commission Executive Director Had Closer White House Ties Than Publicly Disclosed”
New York Times, 3/20/2004, “Clinton Aids Plan to Tell of Warning to Bush Team on Qaeda”
Philip Shenon, 2008, “The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation,” pgs. 149-150, 164-165, 168-171

Zelikow Tightly Controls the 9/11 Commission Investigation
According to Shenon, early in the 9/11 Commission investigation, Zelikow took over control of who to hire for staff and what responsibilities they were given. The Commissioners had no staff of their own, which meant all staffers report directly to Zelikow. Zelikow considered this appropriate, stating:

“If commissioners have their own personal staff, this empowers [them] to pursue their own agenda.”

Also, staff members were given offices at a separate location from the Commissioners and were not allowed to know where the Commissioners were located. Based on numerous interviews with the 9/11 Commission staff, Shenon concluded:

“…the staff could see that with every passing day, Zelikow was centralizing control of the day-to-day investigation in his own hands. He was becoming the eleventh commissioner and, in many ways, more powerful than the others.” 

Zelikow issued the staff members a five-page memo, entitled “What Do I Do Now?” which instructed them:

“If you are contacted by a commissioner, please contact [deputy executive director] Chris [Kojm] or me. We will be sure that the appropriate members of the Commission’s staff are responsive.”

Regarding this move, Shenon wrote:

“It occurred to several of the staff members, especially those with experience on other federal commissions, that Zelikow was trying to cut off their contact with the people they really worked for—the commissioners.”

When Commissioners Jamie Gorelick and Max Cleland discovered this restriction, they objected and lobbied Chairmen Kean and Hamilton to overturn it.

After just three months, Zelikow developed a complete outline of the final report even though the investigation has barely begun and was not scheduled to conclude for another 16 months. The outline was highly detailed, containing chapter headings, subheadings, and sub-subheadings. Zelikow then showed it to Chairmen Kean and Hamilton. They liked it, but worried it could be seen as evidence that they had pre-determined the outcome. Therefore, they decided to keep the outline a secret from the staff. When the staff eventually found out over a year later, they were alarmed.

Source:
Philip Shenon, 2008, “The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation,” pgs. 69-70, 81-86, 388-389

Zelikow Frequently Violates Ban on Private White House Communications
According to the Associated Press and ABC News, throughout his work at the Commission, Zelikow had numerous private phone calls with White House officials such as senior advisors Condoleezza Rice and Karl Rove despite a formal ban on such communications. Per Shenon, after many such calls were recorded by his assistant Karen Heitkotter, Zelikow ordered her to no longer log his calls with the White House. According to Shenon, Heitkotter was worried this may not be proper, so she consulted the Commission’s legal counsel, Dan Marcus, who told her to continue logging the calls. In September of 2003, the staff discovered the phone logs. Many were furious and saw it as evidence that Zelikow was a White House mole. Some debated making a formal protest to the Chairmen, but ultimately chose not to for fear that doing so would publicly tarnish the Commission’s legacy.

Sources:
ABC News, 1/30/2008, “Ex-9/11 Panel Chief Denies Secret White House Ties”
Associated Press, 2/4/2008, “Book: 911 Commission Executive Director Had Closer White House Ties Than Publicly Disclosed”
Philip Shenon, 2008, “The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation,” pgs. 107, 171-172

Bush Administration Withholds Intelligence, Risking Subpoena; Zelikow Single-Handedly Prevents White House Subpoena, Returns to Work for Rice
In October of 2003, the Bush administration continued to withhold classified intelligence documents from the 9/11 Commission against the ongoing protests of its leaders. The Chairman, former Republican governor of New Jersey Thomas Kean, publicly warned that he would begin using subpoenas to obtain the documents. He told the New York Times (10/26/2003):

“Any document that has to do with this investigation cannot be beyond our reach. I will not stand for it. That means that we will use every tool at our command to get hold of every document.”

Kean’s views were widely shared by the other Commissioners, some of whom also accused the administration of dragging its feet to run out the clock. Former Republican Senator Slade Gorton told the New York Times (10/26/2003):

“This lack of cooperation is going to make it very difficult [to meet the deadline].”

Former Democratic senator Max Cleland told the New York Times (10/26/2003):

“It's obvious that the White House wants to run out the clock here. As each day goes by, we learn that this government knew a whole lot more about these terrorists before Sept. 11 than it has ever admitted.”

In November of 2003, the Commission finally struck a deal with the White House by which the withheld documents could only be seen by up to four of the ten Commissioners, who would have varying degrees of access. Those four could then take some notes to share with the other Commissioners after their notes had been vetted by the White House. According to the Associated Press, these restrictions angered some of the Commissioners. Former senator Max Cleland stated:

“This investigation is now compromised… this isn't protection of national security.”

Former Indiana representative Timothy Roemer said:

“The 10 commissioners should either have access to this or not at all.”

In February of 2004, Zelikow narrowly prevented the 9/11 Commissioners from filing a subpoena for access to the White House’s Presidential Daily (Intelligence) Briefs, or PDB’s. At the time, only Zelikow and a small minority of the Commissioners had full access to them. Just before a subpoena was issued, Zelikow worked 48 hours straight to draft a 17-page, 7,000-word summary of the contents. Under the pressure from the White House, the Commission accepted Zelikow’s summary instead of the PDB’s in a reluctant compromise, much to the dismay of the victim’s families. Shenon wrote:

“Many of the 9/11 family groups were outraged by this new compromise…”

After the 9/11 Commission completed its work, Zelikow once again became a top aide to Condoleezza Rice at the State Department, per the New York Times (10/2/2006).

Sources:
Boston Globe/Associated Press, 11/13/2003, “9/11 Panel to Get Access to Withheld Data”
New York Times, 10/26/2003, “9/11 Commission Could Subpoena Oval Office Files”
New York Times, 10/2/2006, “9/11 Panel Members Weren’t Told of Meeting”
Philip Shenon, 2008, “The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation,” pgs. 224-225
Washington Times, 10/26/2003, “9/11 Commission Eyes Subpoena of White House Data”

Most Crucial Details of 9/11 Commission Report Unreliable
In December of 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a 6,000-page classified report on the CIA interrogation techniques used on 9/11 detainees. The Committee also publicly released a much shorter, unclassified executive summary of the report after months of CIA resistance. Here are some of the techniques covered in the Senate Report and the media outlets that covered it that same month, including ABC, NBC, and The Guardian.

1. Detainees were subjected to regular simulated drowning until they began vomiting, convulsing, lost consciousness, and/or their abdomens swelled up with pressurized water.

2. Detainees were subjected to medically unnecessary “rectal rehydration” or “rectal feeding” in which fluids or pureed food were infused into their rectums, leading to anal fissures (tears) and symptomatic rectal prolapse (when the large intestine slips outside the anus.)

3. Detainees were forced to remain awake for up to 180 hours (7.5 days) straight, often while being forced to remain standing, tied up, or shackled in painful “stress positions”. One detainee was chained to a wall in a standing position for 17 days. One detainee was forced to spend 22 hours each day with one or both wrists chained overhead.

4. Detainees were kept naked and in complete darkness and isolation for days at a time, with occasional ice baths and beatings, with loud music playing constantly and causing auditory overload. One detainee died of hypothermia in these conditions. One detainee was completely isolated for 47 days.

5. Detainees were tied tightly into painful positions for several hours at a time, with the bonds tightened further every hour.

6. Detainees were stripped down, bound up with tape, beaten, and slammed against walls while wearing hoods over their heads.

7. Detainees were forced to stand on broken limbs for hours at a time.

8. CIA personnel threatened to hurt, murder, and/or sexual assault the detainees’ parents and children.

9. Detainees were forced to unwittingly participate in mock executions and games of Russian Roulette.

10. Detainees were forced into extremely small spaces, sometimes filled with insects, for long time periods. One detainee spent a total of 266 hours in a box the size of a coffin and an additional 29 hours in box 30 inches by 30 inches by 21 inches.

The NBC report specified that techniques 1-3 and 5 were performed on Khalid Sheik Mohammed, whose testimony was most central the official 9/11 narrative.

According to another concurrent NBC New article (12/9/2014, “Senate…”), the Senate Select Committee also concluded that the enhanced interrogation techniques were either useless or counterproductive in convincing detainees to reveal accurate information that they would have otherwise withheld. The article quoted notes taken by the CIA’s deputy chief of interrogation during Khalid Sheik Mohammed’s interrogations as saying the techniques had “proven ineffective,” they had caused the interrogators to “lose ground,” and the techniques “may poison the well.” Yet another NBC News article (1/30/2008) said the CIA enhanced interrogation methods were known to cause detainees to tell interrogators whatever they think the interrogators want to hear. Several of the detainees confessed to doing this outright when they were later brought before the Pentagon war crimes tribunal. At least one detainee was told the interrogations would not stop until he agreed to sign a confession he was not even allowed to read.

Also per NBC News (12/9/2014 x2), the Senate report found that the CIA for years justified the enhanced interrogation techniques to Congress, the Justice Department, the press, and the public with false information about the results it yielded. In fact, twenty of the most common examples cited by the CIA as evidence that the techniques were effective all turned out to be wrong, at times prompting the agency to make false information its highest priority.

Furthermore, while the CIA was busy claiming its techniques were vital to national security, the Senate report found that the CIA was simultaneously working in deliberate opposition to national security! It did this by restricting all outside access to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and all other high-value detainees. The FBI, Congress, the State Department, the 9/11 Commission, the Director of National Intelligence, and even the CIA’s own inspector general were blocked from questioning the detainees. In one instance, the report showed that the CIA carefully formulated an argument to delay the FBI from gaining access to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed for 3½ years, despite FBI Director Robert Mueller insisting such access would help the FBI understand threats to U.S. cities.

In the civilian world, testimony extracted using the CIA’s methods is not legally admissible in part because of the likelihood of false confessions. Michael Ratner, president of the Center for Constitutional Rights, was quoted by NBC News (1/30/2008) as stating:

“…as a matter of law, evidence derived from torture is not reliable, in part because of the possibility of false confessions…”

Consequently, the CIA detainees were reportedly not eligible to be prosecuted due to how they were interrogated. For example, in May of 2006, the Los Angeles Times pointed out that two presumed key 9/11 planners, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Ramzi Binalshibh, had not been charged with any crime and quoted University of Maryland law professor Michael Greenberger as stating:

“They cannot be prosecuted because of the way they have been interrogated. They have been subjected to very aggressive questioning, and any statements they made now can't be used against them.”

Likewise, in October of 2006, MSNBC reported that the Pentagon told senior federal law enforcement agents not to bother developing a criminal case against suspected “20th hijacker” Mohammed al-Qahtani because the interrogation methods used on him would prevent him from ever being put on trial.

Also, in June of 2008, per the Los Angeles Times, Pentagon war crimes tribunal chief prosecutor, Colonel Morris Davis was forced to resign after he tried to advise against building prosecutions on the coerced and potentially unreliable confessions of 9/11 architect Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and other key detainees. Both Vice President Cheney (LAT, 12/16/2008, CBS News, 12/16/2008) and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld (MSNBC, 10/24/2006) personally approved the interrogation methods.

In May of 2012, the Miami Herald reported that criminal defense attorneys assigned to five of detainees, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, found it impossible to do their jobs because of how their clients had been affected by enhanced interrogation. Attorney James Connell stated:

“These men have endured years of inhumane treatment and torture [that will] infect every aspect of this military commission tribunal.”

All of this is devastating to the credibility of the 9/11 Commission Report. In January of 2008, NBC News reported that 441 of the 9/11 Commission final report’s 1700-plus footnotes were based on the aforementioned CIA enhanced interrogation methods. The 441 footnotes served as the foundation for the report’s most crucial three chapters, which covered initial planning, hijacker arrivals into the United States, and execution of the attacks. Correspondingly, the aforementioned 2014 Senate report called into question the accuracy of the 9/11 Commission’s final report, per NBC New (12/9/2014, “Senate…”). Nevertheless, as Newsweek pointed out in 2009, the Commission’s final report made no mention of the suspect interrogation methods or the doubtful reliability of the responses they elicited.

Here is Michael Ratner’s (president of the Center for Constitutional Rights) NBC News (1/30/2008) quote once again, in context to his criticism of the 9/11 Commission:

“If [the 9/11 Commission] suspected there was torture, they should have realized that as a matter of law, evidence derived from torture is not reliable, in part because of the possibility of false confessions… at the very least, they should have added caveats to all those references.”

According to the New York Times (12/8/2007, 1/2/2008), the 9/11 Commission Chairmen asked for direct access to question the detainees on multiple occasions in meetings with CIA Director Tenet, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and representatives from the White House and Justice Department. However, they were explicitly denied any such access, or even to observe any detainees being questioned through one-way glass. The Commission then posed a long list of questions to the CIA about how they obtained, reconciled, and assessed the credibility of the collective responses of the 9/11 detainees under interrogation. Regarding these questions, the Chairmen later wrote in the New York Times (1/2/2008):

“…the commission never felt that its earlier questions had been satisfactorily answered.”

Further, in late 2007 the New York Times (12/8/2007) broke the story that the CIA had destroyed several tapes of 9/11 detainees being interrogated, despite having years earlier told the 9/11 Commission that the Agency turned over all material related to the interrogations. Over a year later, Newsweek (3/13/2009) updated the total number of destroyed tapes to 92. In response, Chairmen Kean and Hamilton wrote a scathing editorial in the New York Times (1/2/2008) accusing the CIA of obstructing the 9/11 Commission’s investigation and calling for a criminal probe.

The Commission also asked for details about the CIA’s translation process during the interrogations, which the agency likewise never answered to its satisfaction. USA Today later reported that, according to FBI top-secret translator/whistleblower Sibel Edmonds, the Guantanamo Bay translator used in the interrogations had failed his basic translator proficiency exam. However, Edmonds was restricted from testifying of this in court because the government said her testimony could jeopardize national security.

On top of all this, numerous outlets (ABC News (9/29/2003), MSNBC (10/23/2003), NBC (10/23/2003), Newsweek (10/1/2003)) reported that Al Qaeda spies infiltrated the Pentagon’s Islamic chaplaincy and translator programs and gained access to 9/11 detainees. Newsweek described the resulting probe as a “widening espionage investigation” which was “centered on translators and chaplains at the U.S. naval prison for Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”

Sources:
ABC News, 9/29/2003, “Pentagon Reviewing Va. Chaplain School”
ABC News, 12/9/2014, “CIA Torture Report: The Most Stunning Findings”
CBS News, 12/16/2008, “Cheney Was Key in Clearing CIA Interrogation Tactics”
Guardian, 12/9/2014, “Rectal Rehydration and Waterboarding: the CIA Torture Report's Grisliest Findings”
Los Angeles Times, 5/4/2006, “No Trials for Key Players”
Los Angeles Times, 6/5/2008, “Officer Calls Sept. 11 Cases Tainted”
Los Angeles Times, 12/16/2008, “Cheney OK’s Harsh CIA Tactics”
Miami Herald, 5/6/2012, “9/11 Defense Attorneys Call Guantanamo Detention, Trial Rules ‘Unjust’”
Miami Herald, 10/11/2016, “‘Sodomized’ Guantanamo Captive to Undergo Rectal Surgery”
MSNBC, 10/23/2003, “Countdown with Keith Olberman,” John Loftus interview
MSNBC, 10/24/2006, “Can the ‘20th Hijacker’ of Sept. 11 Stand Trial?”
NBC News, 10/23/2003, “Muslim Leader with D.C. Ties Indicted”
NBC News, 1/30/2008, “9/11 Commission Controversy”
NBC News, 12/9/2014, “‘Rectal Hydration’: Inside the CIA's Interrogation of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed”
NBC News, 12/9/2014, “Senate Report Finds CIA Interrogation Tactics Were Ineffective”
New York Times, 12/8/2007, “Congress Looks Into Obstruction as Calls for Justice Inquiry Rise”
New York Times, 1/2/2008, “Stonewalled by the C.I.A.”
Newsweek, 10/1/2003, “Who, and What, Does He Know?”
Newsweek, 3/13/2009, “The 9/11 Commission’s Blind Spot”
USA Today, 11/26/2006, “‘State Secret Privilege’ Blocks Fired Translator from Suing FBI”