CHAPTER 23 - GENERAL EBERHART
Summary
It is standard operating procedure for NORAD to intercept a flight if it has lost radio contact, turned off its transponder, and/or deviated off course (Guardian). NORAD scrambled fighters dozens of times per year to this end (AP, Calgary Herald). All four of the 9/11 flights lost radio contact, turned off their transponders, and went wildly off course, yet NORAD did not intercept any of them. As the Commander of NORAD on 9/11, General Eberhart was ultimately responsible for NORAD’s failures. Nevertheless, Eberhart was never held accountable or even criticized.

After the second WTC impact at 9:03, it was obvious the nation was under attack. Nevertheless, at 9:30 (shortly before Flight 77 hit the Pentagon) Eberhart inexplicably decided to take a 45-minute drive from NORAD headquarters to the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center despite knowing that he would be unreachable due to poor cell phone reception (Com-Eberhart MFR, WAPO, Denver Post).

As we’ve already discussed Eberhart flip-flopped to accommodate the 9/11 Commission’s narrative regarding the cause of the Langley scramble and the timing of NORAD’s awareness to Flights 77 and 93 (Congress-Eberhart Test, Com-Eberhart MFR). He also ridiculously claimed that the massive military exercises held on 9/11 helped NORAD respond to the attacks (Com-Eberhart Test, Com-pg. 465 FN 228).

Sources:
Associated Press, 8/14/2002, “Scrambling to Prevent Another 9/11”
Calgary Herald, 10/13/2001, “NORAD on Heightened Alert: Role of Air Defense Agency Rapidly Transformed in Wake of Sept. 11 Terrorist Attacks”
Denver Post, 7/27/2006, “Military to Put Cheyenne Mountain on Standby” 
Guardian, 9/6/2003, “This War on Terrorism is Bogus”
U.S. Congress, 10/25/2001, “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Role of Defense Department in Homeland Security” (transcript)
Washington Post, 7/29/2006, “Military to Idle NORAD Compound” 
9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with NORAD Commander General Eberhart”
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, Public Hearing Transcript: General Eberhart Testimony
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” Ch. 1 Footnote 228, pg. 465 

NORAD Commander Eberhart Becomes Unreachable In the Middle of 9/11 Attacks
As discussed, previously, NORAD is the military agency responsible for defending North American airspace. As the Guardian pointed out, it is standard operating procedure for NORAD to intercept a flight if it has lost radio contact, turned off its transponder, and/or deviated off course. In 2000 alone, per the Calgary Herald, NORAD scrambled fighters 129 times in response to aircraft that diverted from their flight plans, didn’t file flight plans, or used the wrong positioning frequency. Likewise, per the Associated Press, between September 2000 and June 2001 fighters were scrambled 67 times to intercept suspicious aircraft.

All four of the 9/11 flights lost radio contact, turned off their transponders, and went wildly off course, yet NORAD did not intercept any of them. As the Commander of NORAD on 9/11, General Edward Eberhart was ultimately responsible for NORAD’s failures. Nevertheless, Eberhart was never held accountable or even criticized. Let’s examine Eberhart’s actions on 9/11.

According to the 9/11 Commission Report:

“On the morning of 9/11 General Eberhart was in his office at headquarters—roughly 30 minutes away from Cheyenne Mountain, where the operations center is located.” 

According to his March of 2004 interview with 9/11 Commission staff, Eberhart received a call from the Cheyenne Mountain at 8:45 to inform him of “the ongoing circumstance of a suspected hijacking on the East Coast.” After the second WTC impact at 9:03, it became “obvious” to Eberhart that “there was an ongoing and coordinated terrorist attack.”

After failing to reach the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Hugh Shelton, who “was airborne at the time,” Eberhart “immediately contacted higher command authority at the Pentagon.” This statement was presumably a reference to Shelton’s substitute, acting CJCS Richard Myers. Although, as we covered previously, Myers made the disputed claim that he was on Capitol Hill during the Eberhart call, not the Pentagon.

During the call, according to Myers’ interviews with NBC News and the 9/11 Commission, Eberhart said there were “several hijack codes in the system,” which is a reference to when pilots use their planes’ transponders to squawk the universal hijack code to air traffic controllers all the ground. However, this statement turned out to be incorrect since not one hijacked planes’ transponders squawked the universal code, per CNN.

After the call, Eberhart told the staff that he then decided to stay at NORAD headquarters because “he did not want to lose communication.” However, just minutes later at “approximately 9:30,” seven minutes before Flight 77 hit the Pentagon, Eberhart changed his mind and decided to drive to the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center. The reason he gave the 9/11 Commission was that things had “quieted down.” This stood in contradiction to his stated belief just minutes earlier that there were still “several hijack codes in the system” and the fact that there were still two hijacked airliners in the air.

The 9/11 Commission Report said the 12-mile drive from headquarters to Cheyenne Mountain takes “roughly 30 minutes.” However, the Washington Post in July of 2006 reported that Eberhart took 45 minutes, citing possible bad traffic as an explanation. The Denver Post reported in July of 2006 that during the drive Eberhart “couldn’t receive telephone calls as senior officials weighed how to respond.”

As we saw previously, Eberhart testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee the month after 9/11 that the “NORAD’s Response Times” press release was accurate insofar as the FAA alerted NORAD of Flight 77 at 9:24, Langley scrambled fighters jets in response to this alert, the FAA communicated information concerning Flight 93 from that point forward as well, and NORAD was prepared to shoot down Flight 93 as it approached Washington. However, Eberhart flip-flopped over two years later during his 9/11 Commission interview when the staff presented their new narrative that denied every detail of the NORAD press release and that Eberhart’s prior testimony before congress was false.

We also saw previously that Eberhart ridiculously testified in the June of 2004 public hearing that the “Vigilant Guardian” hijacking exercises that ran simultaneously to the real-life attacks “helped” NORAD’s response to the attacks. This was despite audiotapes from NEADS revealing that technicians there engaged in heated chases of multiple phantom hijackings due to a steady flow of exercise-related misinformation that spiked in the first 1.5 hours of the attacks, per Vanity Fair.

Sources:
Associated Press, 8/14/2002, “Scrambling to Prevent Another 9/11”
Calgary Herald, 10/13/2001, “NORAD on Heightened Alert: Role of Air Defense Agency Rapidly Transformed in Wake of Sept. 11 Terrorist Attacks”
CNN, 9/12/2001, “America Under Attack: How Could It Happen?”
Denver Post, 7/27/2006, “Military to Put Cheyenne Mountain on Standby” 
Guardian, 9/6/2003, “This War on Terrorism is Bogus”
MSNBC, 9/12/2001, “What Was Needed to Halt the Attacks? Cockpit Security, Quick Response Not in Evidence Tuesday”
NBC News, 9/11/2002, “General Richard Myers Interview with Jim Miklaszewski”
NORAD, 9/18/2001, “NORAD’S Response Times, Sept. 11, 2001”
U.S. Congress, 10/25/2001, “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Role of Defense Department in Homeland Security” (transcript)
Vanity Fair, 10/17/2006, “9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes”
Washington Post, 7/29/2006, “Military to Idle NORAD Compound” 
9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of General Richard Myers”
9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with NORAD Commander General Eberhart”
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, Public Hearing Transcript: General Eberhart Testimony
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” Ch. 1 Footnote 228, pg. 465