CHAPTER 24 - ANDREWS AIR BASE
Summary
On 9/11, the military airbase closest to Washington was Andrews Air Force Base – just 10 miles away. Andrews was not part of NORAD. It reported directly to the White House and worked closely with the Secret Service (WAPO). Astonishingly, on 9/11, no Andrews fighter jets were scrambled until 10:38 – a whole hour after Flight 77 hit the Pentagon (Com-pg. 44).

This was despite the fact that the senior Secret Service agent in charge of coordinating the President’s movements (Nelson Garabito) and his FAA counterpart (Terry Van Steenbergen) discussed two additional hijacked aircraft posing threats to Washington D.C. shortly after the 2nd WTC impact at 9:03, immediately asked Andrews to launch fighters, and received shoot down authorization from Vice President Cheney (Com-Garabito MFR, Com-Steenbergen MFR). It was also despite the fact that pilots at Andrews were instantly ready to scramble upon learning of the second WTC impact (WAPO, Com-Cain MFR, Filson-Rasmussen).

The cause of the delay was Andrews’ Commander, Brigadier General David Wherley, who remained in his office and performed no action until after Flight 77 struck the Pentagon (WAPO, Com-Wherley MFR). Only then did he make the several hundred yard trip across the base to the fighter squadron’s headquarters, at which point he refused repeated requests by the Secret Service speaking on the Vice President’s behalf to launch fighters to protect Washington D.C., instead unnecessarily asking to speak to someone of higher rank (Com-Wherley MFR). In a notable deviation from all other staff interviews, Wherley was interviewed one-on-one by the 9/11 Commission’s Executive Director Philip Zelikow, who was also Wherley’s professor at Harvard (Com-Wherley MFR).

Sources:
Washington Post, 4/8/2002, “Flights of Vigilance Over the Capital”
9/11 Commission, 7/28/2003, “USSS Statements and Interview Reports” Garabito Statement and Interview Notes
9/11 Commission, 8/28/2003, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with David Wherley”
9/11 Commission, 3/8/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Major John Daniel Caine”
9/11 Commission, 3/30/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Terry Van Steenbergen”
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pgs. 44 

Secret Service, FAA, and Andrews Pilots Immediately Prepare to Defend Capital; Pilots Grounded Until Attacks Are Over Due to Commander’s Astonishing Inaction
On 9/11, the military airbase closest to Washington was Andrews Air Force Base. Just 10 miles from the capital, Andrews was not part of NORAD, but was home to the President’s plane – Air Force One. It was also home to the 113th Fighter Wing of District of Columbia Air National Guard, or DCANG, whose proclaimed mission was “to provide combat units in the highest possible state of readiness.” According to the Washington Post, the DCANG reported directly to the White House and worked closely with the Secret Service. Astonishingly, on 9/11, no DCANG fighter jets were scrambled from Andrews until 10:38 – a whole hour after Flight 77 hit the Pentagon.

As we saw previously, just after the second WTC impact at 9:03, the senior Secret Service agent in charge of coordinating the President’s movements, Nelson Garabito, established an open, direct line with his FAA counterpart, Terry Van Steenbergen. The two immediately agreed that the White House needed protection and all incoming aircraft should be considered hostile and Steenbergen informed Garabito that two additional planes were considered potential hijacks (almost certainly referring to Flight 77 and 93) and one of them had already turned around and was heading toward Washington D.C. This could only refer to Flight 77.

Upon hearing this news, Steenbergen had his subordinate, Karen Pontius, call Andrews to request that fighters be launched. Also, Garabito called down the PEOC and he received Garabito received presidential shoot-down authorization, which he passed to Steenbergen. As a reminder here, are the key excerpts from their interview notes:

Garabito Statement: “In EOC [Emergency Operations Center] for 9am meeting; second plane struck… Immediately called Terry Van Steenbergen at FAA - he said there were 4 planes believed to be hijacked and 2 outstanding - believed to be traveling to DC. Nelson… contacted the PEOC and placed on speaker…”

Garabito Interview Notes: “Recalls 3 separate groups of info reported by FAA prior to crash: (1) two unaccounted for planes, possibly hijacked, in addition to those that crashed into WTC; (2) one of the unaccounted planes was heading to DC…”

Steenbergen Interview: “…Nelson Garabito of the Secret Service… was calling [Steenbergen] from the White House [Secret Service] JOC [Joint Operations Center]… within 30 seconds of the 2nd plane hitting the Trade Center… all inbound planes were considered hostile.”

Steenbergen Interview: “[Steenbergen] had the three people in his office call over to Andrews, Langley… to see if they would launch some fighter pilots… Karen [Pontius] had worked at Andrews AFB, she made the call over there… [Steenbergen’s] staff had achieved what they were asked to do.”

Steenbergen Interview: “Steenbergen said we needed fighters airborne… National Command Authority needed to give access to shoot down an aircraft. He told Nelson that he needed to get that, if fighters were going to launch to fire… Two minutes after Steenbergen suggested Garabito seek authorization to shoot, he responded that the Vice President had authorized the use of lethal force.”

From these interviews, the long delay to launch fighters from Andrews seems inexplicable.

The delay to launch seems equally inexplicable upon examining the reaction of personnel at Andrews. According to multiple 113th DCANG officers (Major John Daniel Caine, Supervisor of Flying; Major David McNulty, Chief of Intelligence; Captain Brandon Rasmussen, Pilot) interviewed by 9/11 Commission staff members, a number of the unit’s pilots and officers were in a weekly meeting when they were suddenly alerted of the second WTC Tower impact just after 9:03. They all immediately knew it was a coordinated attack and that they needed to get planes into the air. Pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Steve Chase told the Washington Post, “People just launched into action… There was a buzz in the unit. People got on the radio and telephones to higher headquarters.”

However, the cause of delay is apparent upon examining the actions of the DCANG Commander, Brigadier General David Wherley. Wherley did not testify before the 9/11 Commission, nor was he interviewed by its staff. Rather, in a notable deviation, Wherley was interviewed one-on-one by the Commission’s Executive Director Philip Zelikow, who was also Wherley’s professor at Harvard.

According to the interview notes, as well as the Washington Post, Wherley never made the several hundred yard trip across the air force base the fighter squadron’s headquarters until after the Pentagon attack. When he finally did go to squadron headquarters, he rejected requests by two Secret Service agents (Ken Beauchamp and Beck Editor) speaking on behalf of Vice President Cheney to scramble fights and put a protective Combat Air Patrol (CAP) over Washington D.C. Instead, he asked for “someone higher up the food chain,” per Wherley’s staff interview memorandum. All of this was unnecessary since, as we have seen, Garabito had already received Vice President Cheney’s authorization, which was then passed to Terry Van Steenbergen’s office and then to the Andrews Air Force Base.

However, Cheney later denied all of this in his informal, off-the-record interview with the Commissioners just before the 9/11 Commission came to a close. Lead counselor John Farmer explained in the June of 2004 public hearing:

“The President and the Vice President told us they had not been aware that fighters had been scrambled out of Andrews, at the request of the Secret Service and outside of the military chain of command.”

Sources:
Brandon Rasmussen, 9/18/2003, “Interview with Capt. Rasmussen and Leslie Filson”
District of Columbia Air National Guard website, “Mission Statement” as of September 11, 2001
District of Columbia Air National Guard website, “About the DCANG” as of September 11, 2001
Leslie Filson (author of 2003 book, “Air War over America,” published by the U.S. Air Force)
New York Times, 9/16/2001, “Text of Vice President Cheney's Remarks on ‘Meet the Press’”
Washington Post, 4/8/2002, “Flights of Vigilance Over the Capital”
9/11 Commission, 7/28/2003, “Memorandum for the Record: Visit to Reagan National Airport Control Tower in Alexandria, VA and Andrews Air Force Base Control Tower”
9/11 Commission, 7/28/2003, “USSS Statements and Interview Reports” Garabito Statement and Interview Notes
9/11 Commission, 8/28/2003, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with David Wherley”
9/11 Commission, 3/8/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Major John Daniel Caine”
9/11 Commission, 3/11/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Major David McNulty”
9/11 Commission, 3/30/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Terry Van Steenbergen”
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, Public Hearing Transcript
9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003, Public Hearing Transcript
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pgs. 44, 464, 465