CHAPTER 3 - NORAD, THE PENTAGON AND THE FAA
Summary
NORAD fighters were regularly scrambled dozens of times per year to intercept aircraft which lost radio contact, turned off a transponder, and/or deviated off course (AP, Calgary Herald). Shortly before 9/11, the Bush administration removed NORAD commanders’ decades-long unilateral authority to launch fighter jets (NY Observer) and sought to decrease the number of U.S. fighter jets on 24-hour alert (LAT). The FAA had no formal communication channel directly to NORAD. To obtain assistance from the military, the FAA was required for over 30 years to use the “hijack net” phone bridge with Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) to gain the Defense Secretary’s approval and liaison with NORAD (Com-Belger Test, NYT). Other federal agencies such as the White House/Secret Service and FBI likewise joined the hijack net during a hijacking (Com-Belger Test).

Sources:
Associated Press, 8/14/2002, “Scrambling to Prevent Another 9/11”
Calgary Herald, 10/13/2001, “NORAD on Heightened Alert: Role of Air Defense Agency Rapidly Transformed in Wake of Sept. 11 Terrorist Attacks”
Los Angeles Times, 9/15/2001, “Fighter Jets Assume Protective New Role”
New York Observer, 6/21/2004, “9/11 Tapes Reveal Ground Personnel Muffled Attacks”
New York Times, 3/25/2007, “First Chapter: ‘Rumsfeld’,” by Andrew Cockburn
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pgs. 17-18
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, Public Hearing (Transcript: FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger Testimony)

Despite Lowered Alert Status, NORAD Fighters Intercept Hundreds of Suspicious Aircraft Leading up to 9/11
NORAD is the military agency responsible for defending North American airspace. According to New Jersey’s Bergen Record, on 9/11 NORAD had 14 fighter jets on 24-hour active alert to defend the continental United States, down from 100 in 1997, and down from thousands during the Cold War. This number was not increased in the months before 9/11 despite numerous warnings of pending terrorist attacks involving hijacked airliners (CBS, London times, Los Angeles Times (5/29/2002), Sunday Herald, Guardian). In fact, according to the Los Angeles Times (5/29/2002), Pentagon task forces assigned by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld were pushing to reduce the number further.

Furthermore, as the New York Observer pointed out, about three months before 9/11, the Bush administration rescinded NORAD commanders’ decades-long unilateral authority to launch fighter jets when faced with an air-defense threat. Instead, the administration required that launching fighters first be approved by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.

Air Force Secretary Major General Craig McKinley told the 9/11 Commission in May of 2003 that NORAD fighters were required to be airborne within 15 minutes. However, some media outlets reported that much lower times were standard. For example, the Cape Cod Times, interviewing sources at Otis Air Force Base, reported just 5 minutes.

As the Guardian pointed out, it was standard operating procedure for NORAD to intercept a flight if it has lost radio contact, turned off its transponder, and/or deviated off course. Before 9/11, NORAD fighters were regularly scrambled to intercept aircraft, often for drug interdiction or other reasons. The Calgary Herald pointed out that, in 2000 alone, NORAD scrambled fighters 129 times in response to aircraft that diverted from their flight plans, didn’t file flight plans, or used the wrong positioning frequency. Similarly, between September 2000 and June 2001, fighters were scrambled 67 times to intercept suspicious aircraft, according to the Associated Press. 

As we will learn in coming chapters, all four hijacked flight on 9/11 lost radio contact, turned off their transponders, and went wildly off course, yet NORAD intercepted none of them. 

Sources:
Associated Press, 8/14/2002, “Scrambling to Prevent Another 9/11”
Bergen Record, 12/5/2003, “9/11 Panel’s Air-Defense Probe Grapples with Many Mysteries”
Calgary Herald, 10/13/2001, “NORAD on Heightened Alert: Role of Air Defense Agency Rapidly Transformed in Wake of Sept. 11 Terrorist Attacks”
Cape Cod Times, 9/15/2001, “Local Reservists Await the Call”
CBS News, 4/16/2007, “France Knew of Hijack Plot Before 9/11”
Guardian, 9/6/2003, “This War on Terrorism is Bogus”
London Times, 6/9/2002, “MI6 Warned US of Al-Qaeda Attacks”
Los Angeles Times, 9/15/2001, “Fighter Jets Assume Protective New Role”
Los Angeles Times, 5/29/2002, “Wiretaps May Have Foretold Terror Attacks”
New York Observer, 6/21/04, “9/11 Tapes Reveal Ground Personnel Muffled Attacks”
Newhouse News, 1/25/2002, “Amid Crisis Simulation, ‘We Were Suddenly No-Kidding Under Attack’”
Richard Clarke, 2004, “Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror,” pg. 5
Sunday Herald, 5/19/2002, “Britain warned Bush to expect 9-11 al-Qaeda hijackings”
9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003, Panel 1: “The Attacks and the Response,” public hearing remarks by NORAD Major General Craig McKinley
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pg. 38

FAA Could Not Formally Contact NORAD Directly; Went Through Pentagon for Over 30 Years
During 9/11, the FAA had no formal communication channels directly to NORAD. Therefore, in order to obtain assistance from the military, the FAA was required to use a “hijack net” to communicate with the National Military Command Center (NMCC) located in the Pentagon. The NMCC is the heart of America’s military. In a book excerpt carried by the New York Times in March of 2007, prolific political journalist/author Andrew Cockburn described the NMCC this way:

“In an age when an enemy attack might allow only a few minutes for detection and reaction, control of American military power… [was] supposed to be transmitted from… the National Military Command Center, staffed twenty-four hours a day with as many as two hundred military officers and civilian staff and equipped with arrays of communications systems, including multiple screens for video conferences… This was the operational center for any and every crisis, from nuclear war to hijacked airliners. The command center organized conference calls enabling key officials around the government to communicate and coordinate.”

Once the NMCC was contacted, the Secretary of Defense had to give approval for military support. Once approval was given, the NMCC would then contact NORAD to provide the assistance. This sequence was executed dozens of times going back over 30 years prior to 9/11.

Pages 17-18 of the 9/11 Commission Report explained the procedure this way:

“As they existed on 9/11, the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government… FAA Headquarters in Washington… [would] contact the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC)… to ask for a military escort… The NMCC would then seek approval from… the Secretary of Defense… If approval was given, the orders would then be transmitted down NORAD’s chain of command.”

FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger was the third-highest ranking official at the FAA during 9/11, under FAA administrator Jane Garvey (#2) and Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta (#1). In a prepared statement to the 9/11 Commission of June 17, 2004, Belger likewise stated:

“Before 9/11, FAA’s traditional communication channel with the military during a crisis had been through the National Military Command Center (NMCC). They were always included in the communication net that was used to manage a hijack incident… FAA would frequently ask the military, through the NMCC, for airborne surveillance of the hijacked aircraft to monitor its movements.”

“On 9/11 FAA did not have formal dedicated communication channels directly to NORAD.”

During Belger’s verbal testimony that same day, he added:

“The hijacking net is an open communication net run by the FAA hijack coordinator… for the purpose of getting the affected federal agencies together to hear information at the same time. That's the purpose of the hijack net… [T]he fundamental primary source of information between the FAA, DOD, FBI, Secret Service… [and] every other agenc[y] [and] the airlines… is the FAA hijack net…”

“It was my assumption that morning, as it had been for my 30 years of experience with the FAA, that the NMCC was on that net and hearing everything real-time… I've lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career…and they were always there. They were always on the net, and were always listening in with everybody else.”

Sources:
New York Times, 3/25/2007, “First Chapter: ‘Rumsfeld’,” by Andrew Cockburn
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pgs. 17-18
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, Public Hearing (Transcript: FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger Testimony)