CHAPTER 4 - THE START TIME
Summary
FAA Crisis Management Supervisor Mike Weikert opened the hijack net at 8:50 after hearing of the first WTC impact (Com-Weikert MFR). This early start time was corroborated by statements from numerous FAA/White House/NORAD sources, including: 

  • FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger (firsthand witness) (Com-Belger MFR+Test)

  • FAA Federal Security Manager Pete Falcone (firsthand witness) (Com-Falcone MFR)

  • FAA Emergency Operations Staff Manager (formerly FAA liaison to Air Force) Dan Noel Garvey (firsthand witness) (Com-Noel MFR)

  • FAA Administrator Jane Garvey (firsthand witness) (Com-Garvey MFR+Test)

  • FAA Manager Lynn Asmus (Com-Asmus Test)

  • FAA Manager Linda Schuessler (Com-Schuessler Test)

  • FAA Chronology ADA-30 (official 9/11 chronology) (FAA)

  • Air Force official 9/11 history entitled “Air War Over America” (Air Force)

  • Air Force Vice Commander Colonel William Scott (Com-Scott Test)

  • Air Force Secretary General Craig McKinley (Com-McKinley Test)

  • NORAD Continental Commander Major General Arnold (firsthand witness) (Com-Arnold Test)

  • Vice President Cheney (NYT-Cheney)

Various agencies (Weikert listed FBI, State Department, White House situation room, DOD) joined the hijack net promptly (Com-Weikert MFR). However, the NMCC – a formally required liaison between the FAA and NORAD – forsook its thirty-year history of prompt participation and did not join until half an hour later at 9:20 (Com-Weikert MFR, Com-Belger MFR+Test, Com-Falcone MFR, FAA).

However, the 9/11 Commission lied and said the hijack net did begin or link in any other government agencies before 9:20 (Com-pg. 36, 462). Chronologies of the hijack net were generated (Com-Weikert MFR, Com-Belger MFR). However, the Justice Department withheld them from the public domain and the 9/11 Commission did not cite them as sources (Com-Belger MFR).

Sources:
FAA, 9/11/2001, “Chronology ADA-30, Sept. 11, 2001.”
Leslie Filson, 2003, “Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission,” pgs. 59, 71-73, published by Tyndall Air Force Base Public Affairs Office
New York Times, 9/16/2001, “Text of Vice President Cheney's Remarks on ‘Meet the Press’”
9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003, Public Hearing (Transcript: Commissioner Ben-Veniste reading FAA document entitled, “FAA Communications with NORAD on September 11th, 2001,” prepared by FAA Administrator Jane Garvey, Mr. Asmus, Ms. Schuessler)
9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003, Public Hearing (Transcript: Colonel William Scott, Major General Craig McKinley, Major General Larry Arnold Testimonies)
9/11 Commission, 10/21/2003, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Administrator] Jane Garvey”
9/11 Commission, 4/20/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Deputy Administrator] Monte Belger” (including handwritten notes)
9/11 Commission, 4/28/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Emergency Operations Staff Manager] Dan Noel”
9/11 Commission, 5/7/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Crisis Management Supervisor] Michael Weikert”
9/11 Commission, 5/11/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Federal Security Manager] Pete Falcone”
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, Public Hearing (Transcript: FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger Testimony)
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pgs. 36, 462 (Ch. 1 FN 188)

All Evidence Points to Early Hijack Net Start Time; Commission Rejects, Contradicts Itself; Evidence Is Suppressed
The FAA hijack net consisted of two parts. The “tactical net” was used for FAA headquarters to communicate with other FAA entities such as the FAA Command Center and regional air traffic control centers (Boston, New York, Washington, Cleveland, etc.). The “primary net” was used for FAA headquarters to communicate with other government agencies such as the NMCC, FBI, and Secret Service. FAA Crisis Management Supervisor Mike Weikert “was handling the primary net for most of the day,” according to his 9/11 Commission staff interview memorandum, which further explained:

“There were two teleconference nets; a primary and a tactical. The tactical was designed for FAA internal use – other FAA offices and field units. The primary net would engage… other agencies…”

“We had 11 positions in the ACC [Aviation Crisis Center, where the hijack net was run]… Two positions [Mike Weikert on primary and Pete Falcon on tactical] would oversee the other 9 in the ACC.”

Regarding the start time of the tactical and primary nets, Weikert’s memorandum stated:

“At 8:45 AM, he [Weikert] and his colleague… were paged simultaneously… He got an initial brief… He told [his colleague], ‘Let's open up the nets and fire up the command center.’”

Notice Weikert’s use of the word “nets,” plural, referring to the tactical and primary nets. This moment resulted in both nets being initiated at 8:50. However, on the morning of 9/11 the NMCC unimaginably forsook its 30-plus year history of prompt attendance and neglected to call in for half an hour despite being “staffed twenty-four hours a day with as many as two hundred military officers and civilian staff and equipped with arrays of communications systems… for any and every crisis, from nuclear war to hijacked airliners,” as we saw earlier from the New York Times. Because the primary net by definition includes the NMCC, it did not officially begin until the NMCC finally called in at 9:20 even though the FAA and various other government entities had been communicating over it long prior.

Weikert’s interview memorandum stated:

“The primary net as defined has the NMCC… monitoring the net as a protocol.”

“He [Weikert] relied on the [hijack net] personnel to use a checklist to alert relevant parties to the primary net. FBI, State Department, White House situation room, DOD… There was some effort to get the military on one of the nets. It was an open question: ‘Does anyone have contact with the military right now?’ It was Monte Belger that was framing the question at the time… Roughly 9:20 the [NMCC] line was activated.”

Similarly, the 9/11 Commission staff interview memorandum of FAA Federal Security Manager Pete Falcone, who helped Weikert run the hijack net, stated:

“He [Falcone] tried to reach NMCC. He couldn't reach them. That was surprising to him… NMCC was supposed to be on it…”

Monte Belger corroborated Weikert and Falcon and expressed that he was shocked and angered by the NMCC’s tardiness when he was questioned by the 9/11 Commission on June 17, 2004. Here is part of that exchange:

Belger: “It is clear I think in the record that at 9:20 the FAA operations center did call the National Military Command Center and add them into the hijacking net… It was my assumption that morning, as it had been for my 30 years of experience with the FAA, that the NMCC was on that net and hearing everything real-time… And I can tell you I've lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career… and they were always there. They were always on the net, and were always listening in with everybody else.”

Commissioner Gorelick: “At some point, however, in the course of that call you became aware that the military was not involved in any meaningful way. Is that correct? We heard some rather colorful language came from your mouth at that point.”

Belger: “I don't doubt that… I wasn't very happy.”

The “record” Belger mentioned was “Chronology ADA-30.” The publicly available version of this record has completely redacted events listed at both 8:50 and 9:20. This record will be discussed more in a moment.

Other sources corroborated the hijack nets’ early start time and the NMCC’s tardiness as well. For example, FAA Emergency Operations Staff Manager (formerly FAA liaison to Air Force) Dan Noel’s 9/11 Commission staff interview memorandum stated:

“…the tactical net was established at 8:50…”

Likewise, handwritten notes from Monte Belger’s staff interview stated:

“Tactical Net Internal to FAA
Primary Net bring in other Fed agencies
SS [Secret Service]
FBI
DoD (NMCC)”

“From Logs
Tac Net 0850
Primary Net 0920”

“Primary [net]… NMCC should have been on first”

Also, the memorandum from the staff interview with FAA Administrator Jane Garvey stated:

“After the second crash, she… was listening in on the [hijack net] communications, it was clear the other agencies had been pulled in to the call…”

And, regarding the Secret Service’s early participation, Vice President Cheney stated on NBC’s Meet the Press less than a week after 9/11 (transcribed by the New York Times):

“The Secret Service has an arrangement with the FAA. They had open lines after the World Trade Center was [hit].”

Due to its dereliction, the NMCC was apparently circumvented as a middleman between the FAA and NORAD. During the May 23rd, 2003, 9/11 Commission public hearing when Commissioner Ben-Veniste read aloud an FAA document entitled, “FAA Communications with NORAD on September 11th, 2001,” prepared by FAA Administrator Jane Garvey and two “high level individuals at FAA, Mr. [Lynn] Asmus and Ms. [Linda] Schuessler.” Per Ben-Veniste, the document stated:

“Within minutes after the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center, the FAA immediately established several phone bridges that included FAA field facilities, the FAA command center, FAA headquarters, DOD, the Secret Service and other government agencies. The U.S. Air Force liaison to the FAA immediately joined the FAA headquarters phone bridge and established contact with NORAD on a separate line.”

It is unknown who from the military liaison office at FAA headquarters reached out to NORAD. The memorandum from the staff’s interview with the head of this office – Colonel Cheryl Atkins – said that she personally did not participate in the hijack net. (She went to the Air Traffic Situation Room, not the Aviation Crisis Center, where the hijack net was run.) The memorandum makes no mention of her subordinates’ activities. However, there is broad corroboration of the Garvey/Asmus/Schuessler document from NORAD officials. For example, in May of 2003, Air Force Vice Commander Colonel William Scott and Air Force Secretary Major General Craig McKinley testified before the 9/11 Commission that at “9:16 [before the NMCC joined the hijack net], now FAA reports [to NORAD] a possible hijack of United Flight 93, which is out in the Ohio area…”

NORAD Continental Commander Major General Larry Arnold likewise stated:

“…the second aircraft crashed into the tower… And then very shortly thereafter we got a call… [that] United 93 flight being a possible hijacking.”

“…United 93… was being pointed out to us very aggressively I might say by the FAA.”

This was also corroborated by the Air Force’s official record of the 9/11 attacks published in 2003 by the Tyndall Air Force Base Public Affairs Office under the name, “Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission.” For example, page 59 quoted Major General Larry Arnold as stating that shortly after the 2nd WTC impact, “we were getting calls about United Flight 93…” Then pages 71-73 quoted Arnold describing at length a conference call with the FAA and his three subordinate commanders over the Northeastern, Western, and Southeast NORAD sectors (Colonels Robert Marr, John Cromwell, and Larry Kemp, respectively.) The book said of Arnold, Marr, Cromwell, and Kemp:

“They were making fast decisions as the FAA reported more information.”

The 9/11 Commission Final Report appears to have made every effort to cover up the hijack nets’ 8:50 start time and the NMCC’s breathtaking dereliction. On page 36 it stated:

“At about 9:20, security personnel at FAA headquarters set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies, including the Defense Department… Acting Deputy Administrator Belger was frustrated to learn later in the morning that the military had not been on the call.”

The first sentence was a blatant lie. As we have seen, (according to Mike Weikert who ran the net, with corroborating statements from Pete Falcon, Monte Belger, Dan Noel, Jane Garvey, Vice President Cheney, Lynn Asmus, Linda Schuessler, Colonel Scott, Major General McKinley, Major General Larry Arnold, and the official Air Force 9/11 record) the FAA hijack net was set up at 8:50 with other government agencies being brought in well before the NMCC. Furthermore, the second sentence contradicts the first. The first sentence said the Defense Department was on the call as soon as it was established. And the second sentence said the call was established before the military joined, to Belger’s frustration. Which is it?

To support its false claim, the Commission report cited footnote 188 on page 462, which said:

“For the time of the teleconference, see FAA record, Chronology ADA-30, Sept. 11, 2001.”

“Chronology ADA-30” is a publicly available 25-page FAA record with time-marked events beginning early September 11 through late September 26. Remember, this is the same record mentioned earlier – the one which Monte Belger pointed to as evidence of the NMCC’s 9:20 join time. As stated, the events listed at both 9:20 and 8:50 are completely redacted. Behind the redactions, these events undoubtedly say the hijack net (both the tactical and primary nets) were initiated at 8:50, but the NMCC did not join until 9:20.

Furthermore, there were additional records withheld from the public that specified the time at which each hijack net participant joined. The memorandum from Mike Weikert’s staff interview stated:

“An event recorder for the primary and an event recorder for the tactical nets were located in the room… Event recorders were computerized. It was a software product designed in-house. The system was fairly new. It was capable of tracking multiple events. They were kept that day. The log was kept running for some time.”

Correspondingly, the memorandum from Monte Belger’s staff interview stated:

“He [Belger] thinks when the [hijack net] calls other agencies to bring them into the net the time of the call is recorded and logged… Belger believes he received prepared chronologies regarding the primary net. Belger commented that there was guidance from the Justice Department not to publicly release any time-specific document post-9/11.”

Sources:
FAA, 9/11/2001, “Chronology ADA-30, Sept. 11, 2001.”
Leslie Filson, 2003, “Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission,” pgs. 59, 71-73, published by Tyndall Air Force Base Public Affairs Office
New York Times, 9/16/2001, “Text of Vice President Cheney's Remarks on ‘Meet the Press’”
New York Times, 3/25/2007, “First Chapter: ‘Rumsfeld’,” by Andrew Cockburn
9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003, Public Hearing (Transcript: Commissioner Ben-Veniste reading FAA document entitled, “FAA Communications with NORAD on September 11th, 2001,” prepared by FAA Administrator Jane Garvey, Mr. Asmus, Ms. Schuessler)
9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003, Public Hearing (Transcript: Colonel William Scott, Major General Craig McKinley, Major General Larry Arnold Testimonies)
9/11 Commission, 10/21/2003, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Administrator] Jane Garvey”
9/11 Commission, 3/26/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Military Liaison] Colonel Cheryl Atkins”
9/11 Commission, 4/20/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Deputy Administrator] Monte Belger” (including handwritten notes)
9/11 Commission, 4/28/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Emergency Operations Staff Manager] Dan Noel”
9/11 Commission, 5/7/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Crisis Management Supervisor] Michael Weikert”
9/11 Commission, 5/11/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Federal Security Manager] Pete Falcone”
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, Public Hearing (Transcript: FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger Testimony)
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pgs. 36, 462 (Ch. 1 FN 188)