CHAPTER 7 - THE WHITE HOUSE TELECONFERENCE
Summary
White House Terrorism Advisor Richard Clarke led the White House teleconference and said its participants – including Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Myers, and later Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz – were warned by the FAA via Administrator Jane Garvey of Flight 93 before the Pentagon impact and received presidential shoot down authorization via Vice President Cheney between 9:42 and 9:54 (Clarke). The 9/11 Commission rejected all of these points, never sought to question Clark about them when he testified or afterward, and did not quote cite any recording or transcript of the teleconference (Com-pg. 36-41, Com-Clark Test) even though there were participants known to have recorded their communications (Rutgers, NYT, Com-Belger Test, Com-Garvey Test) by which the White House teleconference content could have been reconstructed.

Sources:
New York Times, 9/7/2011, “Newly Published Audio Provides Real-Time View of 9/11 Attacks”
Richard Clarke, 2004, “Against All Enemies,” pgs. 1-8
Rutgers University Law Review, 9/7/2011, “Full Audio Transcript”
9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004, Public Hearing Transcript: Testimony of Former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, National Security Council Richard A. Clarke
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pgs. 36, 41

9/11 Commission Claims No Useful Information Provided Over White House Teleconference, Top Military Leaders Did Not Participate, No Shoot Down Authorization Was Passed; Teleconference Leader and Top Military Officials Assert the Opposite
We previously saw that the man who led the White House teleconference – perennial (since the 1980s) White House Terrorism Advisor Richard Clarke – said in the opening pages of his March of 2004 book that FAA Administrator Jane Garvey reported Flight 93 as a potential hijack sometime before the Flight 77 impact at 9:37 and that the Secret Service and the FAA were both tracking Flight 77 during its approach to Washington D.C.

Corroborating Clarke, we saw that numerous sources agreed that the FAA in this same time frame was warning the White House, Secret Service, NORAD, and/or the NMCC about Flight 77 and/or Flight 93. Sources included Garvey, Belger (firsthand witness), Weikert (firsthand witness), Asmus, Schuessler, Steenbergen (firsthand witness), FAA, NORAD, Eberhart, Scott, McKinley, Arnold (firsthand witness), the Air Force, Marr (firsthand witness), Powell (firsthand witness), Mineta (firsthand witness), Riggs (firsthand witness), Cheney, Garabito (firsthand witness), Winfield (firsthand witness), Myers (firsthand witness) and Wolfowitz (firsthand witness).

However, the 9/11 Commission Report said on page 36 that the White House teleconference participants did not have “any prior information that American 77… was heading directly toward Washington.” The report further said that FAA Administrator Jane Garvey did not join the teleconference until 9:40, after Flight 77 crashed. To support this claim, the 9/11 Commission once again cited the FAA record, “Chronology ADA-30.” As with the all-important 8:50 and 9:20 events, the 9:40 event of this record is once again completely redacted. The report further said on page 41 that the White House did not learn Flight 93 was hijacked around the time it crashed at 10:03.

Clarke also said that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and acting Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General Myers joined the teleconference from its first moments. Clarke further said that Vice President Cheney was in the PEOC and received presidential shoot-down authorization before Air Force One took off in Florida at 9:54. Clark further said he immediately passed word of this authorization to Myers, Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who had also joined by that time. As a reminder, here are two condensed quotes that encapsulate Clarke’s narrative:

“As I entered the Video Center… I could see people rushing into studios around the city: Donald Rumsfeld at Defense… General Dick Myers was filling in for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs… [FAA Administrator Jane] Garvey read from a list… ‘Here’s what we have as potential hijacks… United 93 over Pennsylvania… [Secret Service Director Brian] Stafford slipped me a note. ‘Radar shows aircraft [Flight 77] headed this way.’ Secret Service had a system that allowed them to see what FAA’s radar was seeing.”

“[Fenzel said:] ‘Air Force Once is getting ready to take off… Tell the Pentagon they have authority from the President to shoot down hostile aircraft, repeat, they have authority to shoot down hostile aircraft.’ …I was amazed at the speed of the decisions coming from Cheney and, through him, from Bush… [Clark said to Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Myers:] ‘DOD, DOD… the President has ordered the use of force against aircraft deemed to be hostile.’”

We also saw that Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Robert Andrews corroborated Clarke regarding Rumsfeld’s early attendance of the White House teleconference, stating:

“The moment I saw the second plane strike ‘live’, I knew Secretary Rumsfeld would need the most up-to-date information, and ran down to our counterterrorism center to get maps of New York and other data to take to him in the Executive Support Center. I was there in the Support Center with the Secretary when he was talking to (White House Counterterrorism Advisor Richard) Clarke on the White House video-teleconference, and to the President.”

We also saw that the NMCC’s Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) Brigadier General Montague Winfield corroborated Clarke regarding Cheney passing presidential shoot down authorization while Flight 93 was approaching Washington, stating:

“We received the report from the FAA that Flight 93 had turned off its transponder, had turned, and was now heading towards Washington, DC. The decision was made to try to go intercept Flight 93. The Vice President briefed into the conference that the President had given us permission to shoot down innocent civilian aircraft that threatened Washington, DC. …It was about, you know, 10:03 that the fighters reported that Flight 93 had crashed.”

Likewise, acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Myers stated:

“Army Brig. Gen. Montague Winfield was the duty officer in charge of the center that morning… he was participating in a conference call linking the NMCC, North American Aerospace Command (NORAD), and the White House… We learned that there was apparently a fourth hijacked aircraft, United Airlines 93… ‘NORAD estimates the aircraft is headed toward Washington,’ Winfield said. ‘Vice President Cheney has forwarded the President’s authorization to go Weapons Free [permission to shoot down] if that plane is confirmed hijacked and threatens the White House or the Capitol.’”

Likewise, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated:

“We went into the NMCC, where the Secretary was [actually he was in a teleconferencing studio adjacent to the NMCC, per Clark and Andrews], and General Myers. …We proceeded with discussions by secure video conference. One issue was what to do about the plane over Pennsylvania, getting orders to get fighters up to intercept it, and the Secretary getting approval from the President to shoot it down.”

However, the 9/11 Commission rejected all of Clarke’s key assertions, as well as those of Andrews, Winfield, Myers, and Wolfowitz, which was crucial to its narrative about Flight 93, as we will see in coming chapters.

Clarke testified before the 9/11 Commission toward the end of the same month his book was released – March of 2004. This was four months before the 9/11 Commission Final Report was released, meaning the Commissioners or their staff had plenty of time to re-interview Clarke if they chose. During Clarke’s March testimony, not only did the Commissioners not seek to clarify any of the aforementioned discrepancies, but they did not ask even one question about the White House teleconference he led.

As with the FAA’s all-important hijack net, no audio recording or transcript of the White House teleconference was ever quoted or cited despite it being participated in by numerous agencies such as FAA headquarters, Defense Department, FBI, CIA, State Department, and Justice Department (per the 9/11 Commission Final Report pg. 36). We know from the aforementioned 114 recordings/transcripts released by the 9/11 Commission (via Rutgers and New York Times) in 2011 that communications by FAA headquarters and the FBI were certainly recorded and the same can likely be said of the White House Situational Room itself and the other agencies that participated. Did the 9/11 Commission ever ask these entities for tapes or transcripts of the White House teleconference?

Sources:
ABC News, 9/11/2002, “9/11: Interviews by Peter Jennings” (Interview of Army Brigadier General Montague Winfield)
Drs. Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, 4/19/2001, “Pentagon Attack Interview with Paul Wolfowitz” (transcript)
FAA, 9/11/2001, “Chronology ADA-30, Sept. 11, 2001.”
Naval Post Graduate School Newsletter, Volume 1, Issue 10, September 2004, “Special Operations Policy Expert and Veteran Robert Andrews Gives Distinguished Visiting Guest Lectures at NPS”
New York Times, 9/7/2011, “Newly Published Audio Provides Real-Time View of 9/11 Attacks”
Richard Clarke, 2004, “Against All Enemies,” pgs. 1-8
Richard Myers, 2009, “Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security,” pgs. 151-152
Rutgers University Law Review, 9/7/2011, “Full Audio Transcript”
9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004, Public Hearing Transcript: Testimony of Former National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, National Security Council Richard A. Clarke
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pgs. 36, 41