CHAPTER 9 - THE FLIGHT 93 ALERT
Summary
As we have seen, the 9/11 Commission rejected broad agreement amongst FAA/NORAD/White House/Secret Service/Pentagon sources – in addition to media reports (AP, CBS, WAPO) – concerning the military’s early notification of Flight 93. Of particular interest were the highly specific and harmonious firsthand accounts by NORAD’s command chain consisting of NORAD Continental Commander Arnold (Com-Arnold Test, Air Force-Arnold), NEADS Commander Marr (Com-Marr MFR, Air Force-Marr, ABC-Marr, Newhouse News-Marr, Com-OIG Letter), and NEADS Technician Powell (Com-Powell MFR) of tracking Flight 93 as it headed west, expressing concern that it might hit a target in Chicago or Detroit, watching it turn back toward Washington D.C. radar, and ordering the Langley scramble in response. While all NEADS conversations were always recorded (Kean/Hamilton), Powell specifically said this Flight 93 tracking conversation was recorded (Com-Powell MFR).
Of additional interest are somewhat specific and harmonious firsthand accounts of Brigadier General Winfield (ABC-Winfield), Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Myers (Myers, Congress-Myers), and Defense Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz (PBS-Wolfowitz, Pentagon-Wolfowitz, NYT-Wolfowitz) tracking and preparing to shoot down Flight 93 from within the NMCC. Cleveland flight controllers were in a position to corroborate their reports, but were gagged by the government (Independent).
Instead, the 9/11 Commission claimed the military never learned about Flight 93 until after it crashed – over half an hour after it was hijacked (Com-pg. 30, 34). To support this position, it cited one 10:07 call in which a Cleveland controller told a NEADS technician Flight 93 was hijacked (Com-pg. 30). This call by itself did not come close to proving all other sources were inaccurate. Nevertheless, the 9/11 Commission publicly released the one phone call that supported its narrative and withheld all contradictory evidence cited (Rutgers, NYT).
The 9/11 Commission’s narrative also ridiculously implied that the FAA Command Center personnel never mentioned Flight 93 over the hijack net for over half an after learning about it (Com-pg. 28), military liaisons there never reached out to the other military personnel for over half an hour (Com-Belger Test), and the military liaisons at the Cleveland Center never reached out to other military personnel for over half an hour (Com-pg. 28, 30) – all in the middle of a known terrorist attack involving multiple hijacked commercial airliners.
The 9/11 Commission claimed Flight 93 was proceeding normally at 9:16 to support its assertion that the widely reported 9:16 alert could not have happened (Com-pg. 34). However, no aircraft in the northeastern United States were proceeding normally due to the FAA’s unprecedented measures to clear the skies in the entire region (Air Force), which resulted in course deviations and may have contributed to the numerous erroneous hijack reports that morning (Com-pg. 28, Clarke, Belger-MFR). However, even if the 9:16 alert was not due to a course deviation, it is highly likely it was identified as an early potential hijack by the FBI/FAA through the use of passenger profiling, just like Delta 1989 was considered a possible hijack due to passenger profiling around the same time (Com-Weikert MFR), Com-Belger Test, Com-Garvey MFR).
Sources:
ABC News, 9/11/2002, “9/11: Interviews by Peter Jennings” (Interviews of Army Brigadier General Montague Winfield, NEADS Commander Colonel Marr)
Associated Press, 9/13/2001, “Passengers May Have Thwarted Hijackers”
CBS News, 9/12/2001, “Feds Would Have Shot Down Pa. Jet”
Drs. Alfred Goldberg and Rebecca Cameron, 4/19/2001, “Pentagon Attack Interview with Paul Wolfowitz” (transcript)
Independent, 8/13/2002, “Unanswered questions: The mystery of Flight 93”
Leslie Filson, 2003, “Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission,” pgs. 60, 63, 73, published by Tyndall Air Force Base Public Affairs Office
New York Times, 9/15/2001, “AFTER THE ATTACKS: SKY RULES; Pentagon Tracked Deadly Jet But Found No Way to Stop It”
Newhouse News Service, 3/31/2005, “Commander of 9/11 Air Defenses Retires”
PBS News, 9/14/2001, “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with PBS NewsHour”
Richard Clarke, 2004 book, “Against All Enemies,” (pgs. 1-7)
Richard Myers, 2009, “Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security,” pgs. 151-152
Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton (9/11 Commission Chairmen), 2007, “Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission,” pgs. 85-88
Washington Post, 1/27/2002, “America's Chaotic Road to War”
9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003, Public Hearing (Transcript: Colonel William Scott, Major General Craig McKinley, Major General Arnold Testimonies)
9/11 Commission, 10/21/2003, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Administrator] Jane Garvey”
9/11 Commission, 10/27/2003, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of Lt. Jeremy Powell”
9/11 Commission, 1/23/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of NEADS Commander Colonel Robert Marr”
9/11 Commission, 4/20/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Deputy Administrator] Monte Belger” (including handwritten notes)
9/11 Commission, 5/7/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with FAA Manager Michael Weikert”
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, Public Hearing Transcript (FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger Testimony)
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pgs. 28, 30, 34
9/11 Commission, 7/29/2004, untitled letter from the Commissioners and Executive Director Philip Zelikow to DoD Inspector General Joseph Schmitz and DoT Inspector General Kenneth Mead (includes Colonel Marr’s e-mail to Colonel Scott)
9/11 Commission Rejects Evidence of Military’s Awareness of Flight 93, Cites One Phone Call that Does Not Prove Its Narrative, Falsely Claims Flight 93 Proceeded Normally Before Hijack, Omits Likely Use of Profiling to Identify Hijack Threat
We previously saw that numerous sources confirmed that the FAA informed the military of Flight 93’s hijack before it crashed. Several FAA and military sources stated this directly (Garvey, Belger (firsthand witness), Weikert (firsthand witness), Asmus, Schuessler, FAA, NORAD, Eberhart, Scott, McKinley, Arnold (firsthand witness), Air Force, Marr (firsthand witness), Powell (firsthand witness), Winfield (firsthand witness), Myers (firsthand witness), Wolfowitz (firsthand witness)).
Arnold, Marr, and Powell even gave highly specific firsthand accounts of tracking Flight 93 as it headed west, expressing concern that it might hit a target in Chicago or Detroit, and then watching it turn back toward Washington D.C. radar. And they unanimously agreed that the 9:24 Langley scramble was precipitated by FAA reports of both Flight 93 and Flight 77.
And Winfield, Myers, and Wolfowitz shared first-hand accounts of tracking Flight 93 in the NMCC and nearly shooting it down before it crashed.
Additionally, White House/Secret sources (Riggs, Garabito (plus Steenbergen), Clarke) said the FAA shared pre-impact information with them, which strongly suggested the same would have been shared with the military.
Regarding the near shoot-down, some media sources asserted likewise. For example, according to the Associated Press, the day after 9/11, a New Hampshire flight controller said:
“…an F-16 fighter closely pursued Flight 93… He must’ve seen the whole thing.”
Likewise, the day after 9/11, CBS News reported:
“As the fourth hijacked plane was over Pennsylvania, seemingly headed for Washington… there were two F-16s armed with air-to-air missiles within 60 miles of Flight 93… [but] still out of missile range when the jetliner crashed.”
Both of these reports harmonized with a Washington Post article four months later which described Vice President Cheney shortly after 9:55 repeating a shoot-down order from President Bush when a fighter was less than 60 miles away from Flight 93. The article stated:
“9:55 a.m… Once airborne, Bush spoke again to Cheney, who… recommended that Bush authorize the military to shoot down… civilian airliners… In the White House bunker, a military aide approached the vice president. ‘There is a plane 80 miles out,’ he said. ‘There is a fighter in the area. Should we engage?’ ‘Yes,’ Cheney replied without hesitation... The plane was now 60 miles out. ‘Should we engage?’ Cheney was asked. ‘Yes,’ he replied again. As the plane came closer, the aide repeated the question. Does the order still stand? ‘Of course it does,’ Cheney snapped… It took the Pentagon almost two hours to confirm that the plane had not been shot down, an enormous relief.”
Cleveland flight controllers were certainly in a position to corroborate or refute these reports since Flight 93 crashed within their region of visibility. Unfortunately, they were forbidden from doing so. The Independent stated:
“…the air-traffic controllers in Cleveland who tracked the last minutes of Flight 93 on radar have been forbidden by the authorities to speak publicly about what they saw on their screens.”
Flight controllers in Pittsburgh likewise would have been in a position to corroborate or refute these reports. Strangely, they were ordered to evacuate the control tower. The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette:
“The FAA ordered the Pittsburg control tower evacuated at 9:49 a.m.”
Likewise, the Air Force history stated on page 73:
“Through the fray, [NEADS Commander Colonel Robert] Marr remembers hearing that the FAA was evacuating its Cleveland Center. He didn’t know why at the time and focused on United Flight 93, headed straight toward Washington.”
Nevertheless, the 9/11 Commission claimed that the FAA never alerted the military to the Flight 93 hijack before it crashed. The 9/11 Commission Report stated:
“NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center at 10:07. Unaware that the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircraft's last known latitude and longitude.” (pg. 30)
“In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. This statement was incorrect. There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time.” (pg. 34)
“Nor did the military have 47 minutes to respond to United 93, as would be implied by the account that it received notice of the flight's hijacking at 9:16. By the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed.” (pg. 34)
As you can see from the first quote, the 9/11 Commission supported its claim by citing (not quoting) a 10:07 Cleveland FAA/military liaison call to NEADS. This call obviously does not prove that no military personnel heard about the Flight 93 hijack prior through other channels such as the FAA hijack net or the White House teleconference, as was asserted by numerous aforementioned parties.
However, even the 9/11 Commission’s assertion of what took place at the Cleveland Center does not add up. The 9/11 Commission Report (pg. 28) said Cleveland controllers heard Flight 93 hijack transmissions in real-time from 9:30 to 9:32, notified FAA headquarters by 9:34, and notified the FAA Command Center at 9:36. Both FAA Headquarters and FAA Command Center participated in the hijack net. Is it plausible they never shared over the hijack net for over half an hour the information they received from Cleveland? Not remotely.
And what about the Cleveland Center’s military liaison who made the 10:07 call to NEADS? He was certainly present with the Cleveland controllers and heard the hijack in real-time just like they did. Is it plausible his 10:07 call over half an hour later was really his first attempt to reach out to his military colleagues during a known terrorist attack involving hijacked airliners? Again, not remotely.
Plus, as Monte Belger pointed out in his June of 2004 testimony, the Command Center (which Cleveland contacted at 9:36) had “Military personnel… assigned… [to it who] became involved in coordinating actions with the military.” Is it plausible that those military personnel just sat around from 9:36 until after 10:07 before coordinating anything? Again, not remotely.
In this context, it is outlandish to claim no military personnel became aware of the Flight 93 hijack before 10:07.
Here is one exchange during the June of 2004 public hearing where Commissioner Kerry unsuccessfully tried to shield the military and accuse the FAA of dereliction:
Commissioner Kerry: “Let's talk about 93… At 9:28, Cleveland confirms a hijack. You know it at 9:34… FAA Headquarters knew it and didn't let the military know.”
Monte Belger: “…there were military people on duty at the FAA Command Center… They were participating in what was going on. There were military people in the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization in a situation room. They were participating in what was going on… the NMCC was added to the conference call, the open conference call, at 9:20.”
Moving on, the 9/11 Commission Report asserted (pg. 34) that “There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time.” This line purported to debunk:
Colonel Scott’s and Major General McKinley’s testimony that the FAA reported Flight 93 as a possible hijack at 9:16.
Major General Arnold’s testimony that the FAA “aggressively” reported Flight 93 as a possible hijack before 9:24 and that Flight 93 “wandered around and flew up over the northern part of Pennsylvania…”
NEADS Commander Colonel Robert Marr’s and Lt. Jeremy Powell’s interview statements that Flight 93 reports contributed to the 9:24 Langley scramble.
The Air Force’s official 9/11 history book, which quoted Arnold (pg. 63) as stating “we were getting calls about United Flight 93” shortly after the 2nd WTC impact.
However, the 9/11 Commission’s debunk attempt is not irrefutable for multiple reasons. First, the National Transportation Safety Board (NSTB) Flight Path Study for Flight 93 confirmed that Arnold’s statement about Flight 93 traveling through northern Pennsylvania was correct. And, while it is unclear to what extent this path deviated from Flight 93’s originally planned route, what is clear is that Flight 93 was not “proceeding normally” between the 9:03 second WTC impact and the 9:30 hijacking because no aircraft in the northeastern United States were proceeding normally during that time period.
As the Air Force history pointed out on page 60, shortly after the 2nd WTC impact, “the FAA took unprecedented measures to clear the skies of the northeast United States.” Flight 93’s path through northern Pennsylvania may have been leading to an unscheduled landing in Cleveland, just as aircraft all over the Northeast were preparing to make unscheduled landings at that same time.
All of these course deviations may have contributed to an excess number of possible hijack reports. For example, the 9/11 Commission readily acknowledged (pg. 28) that “multiple” flights were falsely suspected as hijacks that morning. Further, White House Terrorism Advisor Richard Clarke quoted Jane Garvey in his book as stating shortly before the Pentagon impact that FAA headquarters received reports of “eleven… potential hijacks.” Also, handwritten interviewer notes from Monte Belger’s April of 2004 staff interview contained the words: “‘dozens of situations’ we thought were hijack”.
On the other hand, some false hijacking reports were attributable to a massive NORAD hijacking simulation exercise known as “Vigilante Guardian,” which was being run the morning of 9/11. This will be discussed in more detail in a coming chapter.
In any event, the FAA also likely identified Flight 93 as a potential hijack for a different reason than course deviation. Page 11 of the 9/11 Commission Report pointed out that all four 9/11 hijacks were accomplished by four-to-five-man teams of Middle Eastern terrorists who purchased seats in proximity to one another. It is therefore likely the FAA, perhaps in conjunction with the FBI, identified Flight 93 as a potential hijack on this basis before the actual hijacking occurred. In fact, this is why Delta 1989 was temporarily thought to be a hijack. The memorandum from the staff’s interview with FAA Crisis Management Supervisor Mike Weikert says that their suspicion regarding that flight “was the result of profiling”.
Further, there is no doubt that the FBI was engaged early in the hijack alerts. Monte Belger testified that the FBI was on the hijack net before the NMCC and Jane Garvey told the 9/11 Commission staff that she believed she heard them on the line just after the second WTC crash. She also said there were already FBI investigators onsite at Logan airport just after the second WTC crash interviewing witnesses. Therefore, there was certainly time for the FBI and FAA to have used profiling to identify Flight 93 as a possible hijack before the FAA’s 9:16 alert, per Colonel Scott and Major General McKinley.
Profiling commonality may also be why both Major General Arnold and Colonel Marr lumped Delta 1989 and Flight 93 together in their commentary. Recall that in his testimony, Arnold stated:
“…at one time we thought either the Delta flight or the United 93 might pose a threat to Detroit. We tried to get airplanes airborne out of the Toledo Air National Guard at that particular time. ‘Can you get anything airborne? Because we have this United 93 and this Delta. We need to intercept it and see what is going on with those particular aircraft.’”
Likewise, Marr told Newhouse news:
“United Airlines 93 was flying parallel to Delta Flight 1989 over Pennsylvania and heading west. Both were thought to be hijacked, Marr says. ‘At that time, we didn't have any fighters out there… I directed the battle staff to look for anyone who was out there, anyone who could help us out.’”
Sources:
ABC News, 9/11/2002, “9/11: Interviews by Peter Jennings” (Interviews of Transportation Secretary Mineta, Army Brigadier General Montague Winfield, NEADS Commander Colonel Marr)
Associated Press, 9/13/2001, “Passengers May Have Thwarted Hijackers”
CBS News, 9/12/2001, “Feds Would Have Shot Down Pa. Jet”
Independent, 8/13/2002, “Unanswered questions: The mystery of Flight 93”
Leslie Filson, 2003, “Air War Over America: Sept. 11 Alters Face of Air Defense Mission,” pgs. 60, 63, 73, published by Tyndall Air Force Base Public Affairs Office
National Transportation Safety Board, 2/19/2002, “Flight Path Study – United Airlines Flight 93”
Newhouse News Service, 3/31/2005, “Commander of 9/11 Air Defenses Retires”
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 4/16/2002, “Local Officials Rethink Recently Made Plans to Deal with Terrorism”
Richard Clarke, 2004 book, “Against All Enemies,” (pgs. 1-7)
Washington Post, 1/27/2002, “America's Chaotic Road to War”
9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003, Public Hearing (Transcript: Colonel William Scott, Major General Craig McKinley, Major General Arnold Testimonies)
9/11 Commission, 10/21/2003, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Administrator] Jane Garvey”
9/11 Commission, 10/27/2003, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of Lt. Jeremy Powell”
9/11 Commission, 1/23/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview of NEADS Commander Colonel Robert Marr”
9/11 Commission, 4/20/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with [FAA Deputy Administrator] Monte Belger” (including handwritten notes)
9/11 Commission, 5/7/2004, “Memorandum for the Record: Interview with FAA Manager Michael Weikert”
9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004, Public Hearing Transcript (FAA Deputy Administrator Monte Belger Testimony)
9/11 Commission, July 2004, “9/11 Commission Report,” pgs. 11, 28, 30, 34
9/11 Commission, 7/29/2004, untitled letter from the Commissioners and Executive Director Philip Zelikow to DoD Inspector General Joseph Schmitz and DoT Inspector General Kenneth Mead (includes Colonel Marr’s e-mail to Colonel Scott)